Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2013

Plain Packaging and the TRIPS Agreement: A response to
Professors Davison, Mitchell and Voon
Daniel J. Gervais

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel J. Gervais, Plain Packaging and the TRIPS Agreement: A response to Professors Davison, Mitchell
and Voon, 46 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. 1149 (2013)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/840

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Oct 20 11:12:54 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement, 46 VAND. J. Transnat'l L. 1149 (2013).
ALWD 7th ed.
Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement, 46 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1149 (2013).
APA 7th ed.
Frankel, S., & Gervais, D. (2013). Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 46(5), 1149-1214.
Chicago 17th ed.
Susy Frankel; Daniel Gervais, "Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 46, no. 5 (November 2013):
1149-1214
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, "Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement" (2013) 46:5 Vand J Transnat'l L 1149.
AGLC 4th ed.
Susy Frankel and Daniel Gervais, 'Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement' (2013) 46 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1149.
MLA 8th ed.
Frankel, Susy, and Daniel Gervais. "Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement." Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 46, no. 5, November
2013, p. 1149-1214. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, 'Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement' (2013) 46 Vand J Transnat'l L 1149
Provided by:
Vanderbilt University Law School
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

VANDERBILT

JOURNAL

of TRANSNATIONAL

VOLUME 46

LAW

NOVEMBER 2013

Plain
Packaging
Interpretation of
Agreement

NUMBER 5

the
and
the TRIPS

Susy Frankel*
Daniel Gervais*

ABSTRACT

Plainpackaging of cigarettes as a way of reducing tobacco
consumption and its related health costs and effects raises a
number of internationaltrade law issues. The plain packaging
measures adopted in Australia impose strict format
requirements on word trademarks (such as Marlboro or Camel)
and ban the use of figurative marks (colors, logos, etc.). As a
result, questions have been raised as to plain packaging's
compatibility with the World Trade Organization's (WTO)
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement)..
WTO members can validly take measures to protect and
promote public health, but in doing so they must comply with
the WTO agreements. In order to determine compliance, a
proper method to interpret applicable WTO rules is
indispensable for the stability and predictability of the world
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tradingsystem. In this Article, the authors consider the proper
interpretationof the TRIPS Agreement as it applies to plain
packaging regulations using the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT). The VCLT has been adopted several times
in WTO disputes as a set of interpretive rules. The authors
argue that the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement in the
cases filed in 2012 against Australia by a number of developing
countries after Australia's adoption of the plain packaging
legislation is likely to impact future cases involving the TRIPS
Agreement and specifically the method and approach to be used
to interpret it. As such, the cases will likely impact other public
health issues (beyond tobacco use) and the interpretationof the
TRIPS Agreement in several other contexts.
The two major issues discussed in this Article are (a)
Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement, which prohibits certain
unjustified encumbrances on the use of trademarks, and (b) the
debate about the nature of trademark owners' rights in the
TRIPS Agreement. The latter issue has been referred to as the
"right to use" debate-namely, whether trademark owners have
a right to use trademarks protected under the TRIPS
Agreement. The authors contend that the issue is better seen as
a debate over the nature and scope of trademark owners' rights
and interests that the TRIPS Agreement seeks to protect.
Specifically, the Article argues that the fact that the principal
rights of trademark owners under the TRIPS Agreement are
rights to exclude others from using their mark (or "negative
rights') is not determinative of the issue but rather should
inform the interpretationof Article 20 in light of the TRIPS
Agreement's object andpurpose.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is about the rules of interpretation of the World
Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) ' and their
application to the plain packaging of cigarettes, a matter which is
subject to formal dispute-settlement proceedings at the WTO as of
this writing.2
The rules of international treaty interpretation are important.
They provide a degree of consistency so that those who are part of
that rules-based system can use interpretation to predict outcomes
not only of potential and existing disputes but also as a guide to the
boundaries that international agreements place on the formulation

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
1.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2.
See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ukraine, AustraliaCertain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging,WT[DS434/11 (Aug. 17, 2012) (panel
established but not yet composed Sept. 28, 2012); Request for the Establishment of a
Panel by Honduras, Australia-Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks,
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to
Tobacco Products and Packaging,WT/DS435/16 (Oct. 17, 2012) (in consultations Apr.
4, 2012); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the Dominican Republic,
Australia-CertainMeasures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and
Other Plain PackagingRequirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging,
WT/DS441/15 (Nov. 14, 2012) (in consultations July 18, 2012). In May 2013 Cuba
requested consultations with Australia. Request for Consultations from Cuba,
Australia-CertainMeasures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and
Other Plain PackagingRequirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging,
WT[DS458/1 (May 7, 2013).
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and interpretation of WTO members' laws. The principles of
interpretation are thus important for the integrity of the
international intellectual property regime. It is crucial to keep these
principles intact. Conversely, to defy proper interpretation of
international intellectual property agreements in the area of plain
packaging to achieve (valid) public policy objectives may have
negative consequences in several arenas unrelated to tobacco.
This Article is not suggesting that countries are prevented from
regulating public health in general or tobacco more specifically.
Indeed, it asserts that they must be free to do so. However, they must
also comply with international agreements that they willingly ratified
or adhered to. Membership in international agreements almost
always curtails some aspects of national autonomy. Some might say
that is exactly why they are created. For example, few would argue
that a WTO member could validly ban all imports of cigarettes but
allow sales of domestic ones without violating WTO obligations. 3 This
Article seeks to show how a robust approach to legal interpretation
can support legitimate public health aims and why, by the same
token, keeping interpretation rules intact is the best method for
promoting future public health, and more broadly public interest
goals that "collide" with the TRIPS Agreement norms, to succeed in
the future.
To achieve the above-stated objectives, this Article, therefore,
seeks to illuminate how the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted
in light of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 4 which
governs disputes over alleged infringements of WTO agreements,
including the TRIPS Agreement. The core of the DSU's interpretation
rules is the adoption of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention

3.
This fact pattern would almost certainly violate the national treatment
obligation under GATT. See MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS
C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 233-36
(2d ed. 2006) (describing how GATT requires "like treatment and non-discrimination
between domestic and imported goods"). However, there is little doubt that a WTO
member can ban a product completely for public health reasons as was done by the
European Union for asbestos. See Panel Report, European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000)
[hereinafter Asbestos Panel Report]. The panel report was followed by a report by the
Appellate Body, in which it upheld "the Panel's finding[ ] ... that the measure at issue
is 'necessary to protect human. . . life or health,' within the meaning of Article XX(b) of
the GATT 1994 ..... Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, T 192(f), WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar.
12, 2001).
4.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1225 (1994) [hereinafter DSUJ.
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on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).5 The VCLT rules of interpretation
and their use by tribunals have been much discussed.6 Articles 31
and 32 are recognized as the customary international law of
interpretation of treaties.7
Many parties to the TRIPS Agreement are also parties to
bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This article is about the
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, not BITs. 8 From an
interpretation perspective, classifying a trademark as an investment
asset suggests that it means something different from, or perhaps
additional to, a trademark as an intellectual property right. 9
Although the investment aspect is not part of the TRIPS Agreement,
it may be part of the international arrangements between the parties

5.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1115
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. For a discussion,
see generally MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES 415-49 (2009) (discussing the interpretation of treaties under
the VCLT); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 114-53
(2d ed. 1984) (discussing treaty interpretation under Articles 31 and 32); MALGOSIA
FITZMAURICE & OLUFEMI ELIAS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 21822 (2005) (examining the principles of treaty interpretation); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 810-60 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing treaty law); and RICHARD
GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 141-202 (2008).
6.
See generally VILLIGER, supra note 5, at 415-49; SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at
114-53; FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 5, at 218-22; SHAW, supranote 5, at 810-60;
GARDINER, supra note 5, at 141-202.
7.
Article 3.2 of the DSU refers to the customary rules of interpretation. DSU,
supra note 4, at art. 3.2.
8.
The TRIPS Agreement does not characterize intellectual property as an
investment asset. Indeed, the WTO does not include a comprehensive agreement on
investment. Many BITs provide that intellectual property, in one form or another,
including trademarks, is an investment asset. Some also refer to the TRIPS
Agreement. The BIT between Uruguay and Switzerland is the basis of the Philip
Morris action against the Uruguayan government. See Philip Morris Brand SArl
(Switz.), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switz.) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v.
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7. The case is pending. List of
Pending Cases, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtsRH&actionVal=Lis
tPending (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). Similarly, the BIT between Hong Kong and
Australia is the basis of Philip Morris's dispute against the government of Australia.
See Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong
Kong for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-H.K., Sept. 15, 1993,
1748 U.N.T.S. 343. For a discussion of the investment function of trademarks under
EU law, see Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer PLC, 2011 E.C.R. I08625.
9.
It has become a matter of reality that intellectual property rights are
categorized as investment assets. Some argue that this merely serves to extend
intellectual property rights beyond their rational limits. See, e.g., Peter Drahos, BITS
and BIPS: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791, 795
(2001) (discussing how classifying intellectual property as an investment asset
stretches beyond the TRIPS Agreement's requirements).
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to a WTO dispute.' 0 However, even if both parties to a WTO dispute
also have a BIT between them that includes intellectual property as
an investment asset, the BIT still does not directly impact the
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement at the WTO." Further, the
resolution of any dispute under the BIT will take place in a forum
that is separate from the WTO.1 2 The terms of the BIT may require
TRIPS Agreement consistency with, for example, compulsory
licensing measures. 13 However, a BIT tribunal could potentially
interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a different way than a WTO panel
or the Appellate Body. It is a separate question, and beyond the scope
of this Article, as to whether the WTO would take any notice of a BIT
arbitral decision and what effect that might have. It may, however, be
an issue should the BIT disputes relating to plain packaging be
determined before the TRIPS Agreement disputes. 14
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the necessary
context-namely, the relevant TRIPS Agreement articles (Part II.A);
smoking as a public health issue (Part II.B); the Australian
legislation under scrutiny at the WTO (Part II.C); and the

10.
The interpretation within WTO disputes of treaties outside the WTO
context raises complications because the WTO does not have the jurisdiction to
interpret treaties of other organizations and because the parties are not the same. See
Susy Frankel, WTO Application of "the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public
International Law" to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 410-15 (2006)
(discussing the complications that arise when the WTO attempts to interpret treaties
between subsets of TRIPS Agreement signatories). Also, the outcome of a dispute at the
WTO is only binding between the parties to the dispute. Nonetheless, WTO reports are
increasingly treated as having precedential value. See Appellate Body Report, United
States-Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico,
WT/DS344/AB/R,
160 (Apr. 30, 2008) (stating that panels should give "cogent
reasons" for departing from Appellate Body decisions); see also Felix David, The Role of
Precedent in the WTO-New Horizons? 3 (Maastricht Faculty of Law, Working Paper
No. 2009-12, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1666169 ("US - Stainless
Steel represents a further step ... in a line of cases in which the Appellate Body has
gradually sought to expand the binding force of its decisions."). However, panels and
the Appellate Body may use non-WTO sources as interpretive aids. See infra discussion
in Part V.
11.
It is possible that a party could include reference to the BIT in its
submissions before a WTO panel, but the WTO would only have jurisdiction over the
WTO agreements, not over the BIT. See DSU, supra note 4, at art. 1.1; see also supra
note 10.
12.
Many BITs provide for arbitration before a tribunal and under the rules of
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
13.
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Protecting Intellectual Property under BITs,
FTAs, and TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence? 17-18 (Feb. 7, 2011)
(Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop. & Competition L., Research Paper No. 11-02, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1757724 (providing an example of the use of
TRIPS Agreement provisions on compulsory licenses in the interpretation of a BIT).
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 485-515 (Chester Brown &

Kate Miles eds., 2011).
14.
At the time of writing, this seems unlikely.
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Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) 15 and evidence
about plain packaging (Part II.D). Part III discusses applicable
interpretation rules of the VCLT. Part IV considers the rights that
trademark owners may claim under the TRIPS Agreement and may
allege are breached in opposition to governments trying to impose a
ban or severe restrictions on the use of trademarks. It begins by
discussing Article 20, which is central to the plain packaging issues
as it clearly articulates a legitimate interest of trademark owners. Its
centrality arises because the effect of preventing trademark owners
from using their trademarks is, in the words of Article 20, an
encumbrance that is "detrimental to its capability to distinguish the
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings." 16 This Article then discusses the context of Article 20
(as VCLT interpretation requires), particularly the trademark
minimum standards under the TRIPS Agreement, including Articles
15, 16, 17, and 19. There are arguments about these provisions being
breached independently of Article 20.17 Some of the discussion about
the TRIPS Agreement trademark standards will also be relevant to
potential arguments about their breach; however, for reasons
expanded below, the core focus is on Article 20. A key aspect of the
discussion of the substantive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement is
the scope of trademark owners' rights and legitimate interests. Part
of this discussion is what, if any, legitimate interests trademark
owners have to use their trademarks and what the significance of
"negative rights" is in that discussion. Part V turns to the role of
Article 8, which is part of the General Provisions"s of the TRIPS
Agreement, and its applicability to the interpretation of Article 20.

15.
World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S 166 (entered into force Feb. 27, 2005) [hereinafter FCTC].
16.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 20 (referring to "use in a manner
detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking
from those of other undertakings" as being one of three examples of the applicability of
art. 20). As this Article discusses, infra Part IV.A, proper interpretation of Article 20
could include the prevention of non-use of trademarks as an unjustified encumbrance
"in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods or services of one
undertaking from those of other undertakings."
17.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at arts. 15-17, 19, 20. In particular, some
may argue that by interpretation Article 16 includes a qualified or limited "right to
use." Although some of this Article's discussion about Articles 15, 16, 17, and 19 may be
relevant to those arguments, possible violations of other articles of the TRIPS
Agreement is not this Article's focus. If the focus of interpretation is on Article 16, then
the other articles (including Article 20) would be relevant context for Article 16. This
Article's focus on Article 20 leaves aside the possibility that a ban of the use of certain
well-known marks likely to lead to a loss of well-known mark status may amount to a
separate violation of Article 16.2, 16.3, or both. However, this Article discusses that the
added value that these articles recognize, through use of the trademarks, gives rise to
what one might call a positive right. See infra Part IV.
18.
These general provisions are applicable to the whole of the TRIPS
Agreement.
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Article 8 both provides context for Article 20 and is relevant to the
VCLT-based interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement's object and
purpose because it quite simply is a statement about the object and
purpose of it.
This Article also looks beyond the TRIPS Agreement for its
interpretation to two types of sources. The first type of source arises
because the TRIPS Agreement is part of the WTO agreements and,
therefore, other agreements in the WTO collection are relevant
(particularly those that contain provisions that use similar wording to
aspects of the TRIPS Agreement, such as "necessary to protect public
health"). These provisions and the Dispute Settlement Body's (DSB)
interpretation of those provisions are relevant to the interpretation of
Articles 8 and 20. These other agreements and relevant articles are
the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT), 19 particularly
Article 2.2, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 20 Article XX. The second type of source comes from outside
the WTO and may include international agreements such as the
FCTC, which can be used to interpret the meaning of terms not
defined by the WTO, such as public health. Part VI considers an issue
that may determine, at least in part, the outcome of international
litigation about plain packaging-namely, the burden of proof.
Finally, this Article offers a few concluding thoughts.

II PLAIN PACKAGING

AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT IN CONTEXT

A. TRIPS Agreement Issues
When it comes to plain packaging, from an international
intellectual property angle, the issue is whether plain packaging laws
and regulations (and these vary) violate the TRIPS Agreement and
more specifically its trademark provisions. The focus of this Article is
on the type of plain packaging law that bans the use of figurative and
logo trademarks and restricts the size and appearance of word
marks.2 ' The key issues relevant to the plain packaging of cigarettes,
which require interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, can be
summarized as follows:

19.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S.
120 [hereinafter TBT].
20.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT].
21.
At the time of writing, the main example of this is the Tobacco Plain
PackagingAct 2011 (Cth) (Austl.).
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-Whether plain packaging amounts
to an unjustified
encumbrance under Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement; 22
-The relevance of the other parts of the TRIPS Agreement (such
as Articles 15, 16, 17, and 19) to the interpretation of Article 20.
In other words, what the context of Article 20 means for that
article;
-The object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement and the
trademark provisions therein;
-Whether plain packaging measures can be justified because they
are for public health; and
-How Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement informs the
interpretation of Article 20.
Before this Article turns to discuss these issues, it explains some of
the problem with cigarettes.

B. Cigarettesare a Public Health Issue
There is a significant body of evidence that smoking is very bad
for human health and life.2 3 Cigarettes contain toxins that are known
to cause cancer. 24 People continue to smoke even though they know
that smoking can kill them and may be bad for the health of those
around them.2 5 One, if not the main, reason for this is that nicotine is

22.

Article 20 provides:

The use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably
encumbered by special requirements, such as use with another trademark, use
in a special form or use in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish
the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings. This
will not preclude a requirement prescribing the use of the trademark
identifying the undertaking producing the goods or services along with, but
without linking it to, the trademark distinguishing the specific goods or
services in question of that undertaking.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 20.
23.
See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2004), available at

http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/smokingconsequences/index.html
(describing the many health risks associated with smoking tobacco products).
24.
Regina Benjamin, Preface to U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., How
TOBACCO SMOKE CAUSES DISEASE: THE BEHAVIORAL BASIS FOR SMOKING
ATTRIBUTABLE DISEASE, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at iii (2010), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/tobaccosmoke/full report.pdf (enumerating
the harmful chemicals inhaled by smokers); Tobacco Free Initiative: Cancer, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/tobacco/research/cancer/enIindex.html (last visited Oct.
21, 2013) (discussing the link between tobacco and lung cancer); Richard Doll & A.
Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung, BRIT. MED. J. 739, 747 (Sept. 30,
1950) (concluding that a link exists between smoking cigarettes and lung cancer).
25.
See generally W. Kip Viscusi, The New Cigarette Paternalism, 25
REGULATION 58 (2002-2003) (claiming that people continue to smoke despite
overestimatingthe risks of smoking and that taxes are a suboptimal way to address the
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addictive. 26 The World Health Organization (WHO) has described
this as an "epidemic of epic proportions."2 7 Cigarettes are probably
the only consumer product sold where over half its users will die as a
result of its use. 28
Countries use a variety of regulatory tools to reduce the levels of
tobacco consumption.2 9 Some of these countries' measures have, in
recent times, become rather well known.3 0 Uruguay put in place a
series of measures aimed at reducing its overall smoking rate,
including a provision that required health warnings to cover 80
percent of the packaging.31 These measures are part of an overall
package of antismoking measures and have been challenged by the

problem and suggesting instead age restrictions on smoking and the establishment of
nonsmoking areas and smoking lounges). Professor Viscusi also suggests that "[e]ven
in the absence of any additional policy interventions, smoking rates will continue to
decline just as they have over the past half-century. As individual wealth rises, the
value associated with health risks increases as well." Id. at 64.
26.
See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, TOPICS IN BRIEF: TOBACCO AND NICOTINE
RESEARCH (2008), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/topics-inbrief/tobacco-nicotine-research ("Like cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, nicotine
increases levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine in the reward system, producing
lasting changes in the cells of the brain. These changes can eventually lead to
addiction.").
27.
See WORLD HEALTH ORG. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL,
HISTORY OF THE WHO CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 1 (2009), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241563925-eng.pdf ("By the 1990s, the
tobacco epidemic was a public health problem of epic proportions."); see generally
WORLD HEALTH ORG., CONFRONTING THE TOBACCO EPIDEMIC IN A NEW ERA OF TRADE
AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION 37 (2012), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
publications/2012/9789241503723-eng.pdf (commissioned by the WHO Tobacco Free
Initiative).
28.
This Article says "probably" only because evidence about the harmful
effects of a number of widely used chemicals and modified food products is beginning to
emerge. See Known and Probable Human Carcinogens, AM. CANCER SOC'Y,
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/generalinformationaboutc
(last revised May 10, 2013)
arcinogens/known-and-probable-human-carcinogens
(describing various potential carcinogens, including foods and other environmental
concerns). While it seems unlikely that any one of those products would be as harmful
as cigarettes, they are also often less regulated and used with much less information
provided to consumers.
29.
See Omar Shafey & G. Emmanuel Guindon, Monitoring the Tobacco
Epidemic: Past, Present, and Future, WORLD HEALTH ORG., www.who.int/tobacco/
gobal-datalcountry profiles/Methods.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (describing the
various regulatory measures used by different countries).
30.
Id.; see generally Viscusi, supra note 25 (discussing the various regulatory
measures used in the United States).
31.
Presidential Decree No 287/009, June 15, 2009 (entered into force on Dec.
12, 2009) (Uru.); Ordinance N' 514, Aug. 18, 2008, Ministry of Public Health (entered
into force on Feb. 14, 2010) (Uru.); Ordinance N' 466, Sept. 1, 2009, Ministry of Public
Health (entered into force Feb. 28, 2010) (Uru.); see also Uruguay BilateralInvestment
Treaty Litigation, PHILIP MORRIS INT'L, www.pmi.comleng/media-center/company
statements/pages/uruguaybitsclaim.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (describing the
dispute between Philip Morris and the government of Uruguay over these regulations).
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Philip Morris Company under a BIT between Uruguay and
Switzerland. 32 In that dispute, Philip Morris argued that the
Uruguayan measures affect the use of Philip Morris's trademarks to
the extent that they are allegedly expropriated under the BIT.33 The
Uruguayan measures do not, from a trademark perspective, go as far
as the Australian plain packaging measures, which involve the
elimination of figurative or logo marks from the packaging of the
cigarettes.34

C. Australia's PlainPackagingLaw
Under Australia's Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011, cigarette
packages must not only include health warnings but also must
essentially remove all trademarks-and consequently any indicators
of differences between brands-other than the brand name in plain
letters in a relatively small font size.35 The parts of the packaging
that are not dedicated to health warnings must be a brown-green
color-a color chosen on the basis that it would be the least attractive
color to consumers.3 6 These measures make the cigarette packages
almost indistinguishable from one another, so that the so-called
attractive and brand distinguishing trademark features will not
entice people to smoke. 37 As one might expect, there has been

32.
See Philip Morris Brand SArl (Switz.), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switz.)
and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, (July 2, 2013). The case is pending. See List of
Pending Cases, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, icsid.worldbank.org/

ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtsRH&actionVal=ListPending
(last
updated Oct. 21, 2013).
33.
UruguayBilateralInvestment Treaty Litigation, supra note 31.
34.
See Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ss 18-26 (Austl.) (strictly
limiting what marks may appear on packaging and products).
35.
Id. at ss 20-22.
36.

See GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA, TOBACCO PLAIN PACKAGING BILL 2011:

EXPOSURE DRAFT 12 (2011), available at http://www.yourhealth.gov.aulinternet/
yourhealth/publishing.nsflContent/CA2578620005CE1DCA2578A200801397/$File/Plai
n%20Packaging%200f%2OTobacco%2OProducts%20Consultation%2Paper%20-%2006
042011%20FINAL.pdf.
37.
The Tobacco PlainPackagingAct 2011 (Cth) s 3 (Austl.) provides:
Objects of this Act
(1) The objects of this Act are:
(a) to improve public health by:
(i) discouraging people from taking up smoking, or using tobacco products; and
(ii) encouraging people to give up smoking, and to stop using tobacco products;
and
(iii) discouraging people who have given up smoking, or who have stopped
using tobacco products, from relapsing; and
(iv) reducing people's exposure to smoke from tobacco products; and
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considerable opposition from tobacco companies to Australia's law,
and, at the time of writing, various aspects of that position continue
before tribunals.3 8
The stated core intention of Australia's Parliament in passing
the law "regulating the retail packaging and appearance of tobacco
products" is to:
(a) reduce the appeal of tobacco products to consumers; and
(b) increase the effectiveness of health warnings on the retail
packaging of tobacco products; and
(c) reduce the ability of the retail packaging of tobacco products to
mislead consumers about the harmful effects of smoking or using
tobacco products.3 9
While many describe these as public health aims, not all agree
on the exact impact and purpose of the legislation. 40 One of the effects
of this law will be that stylized trademarks, which tobacco companies
apply to their cigarettes to distinguish their brands from other
companies and to make them identifiable to potential consumers, will

(b) to give effect to certain obligations that Australia has as party to the
Convention on Tobacco Control.
38.
Complaints have been brought to the WTO by Ukraine, Honduras, and the
Dominican Republic. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Ukraine, supra
note 2; Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Honduras, supra note 2; Request
for the Establishment of a Panel by the Dominican Republic, supra note 2. A case was
brought to the High Court of Australia challenging the law as an acquisition of
property on unjust terms under the Australian Constitution. The claim was not
successful. See JT Int'l SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 1 3 (Austl.); see also
discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
39,
Tobacco Plain PackagingAct 2011 (Cth) s 3(2) (Austl.).
40.
In JT InternationalSA v Commonwealth of Australia, Justice Heydon of
the High Court of Australia disputed that aim. He stated:
In view of the enormous amounts of money which would probably be needed to
provide just terms, the possibility of evasion in relation to the impugned
legislation cannot be ruled out. The structure of that legislation is very strongly
motivated by an altruistic desire to improve public health-or rather the health
of Australian residents, as distinct from foreigners, for the legislation sees it as
satisfactory to let exporters purvey lies and death to them. But improving
(local) public health is not the fundamental concern of the impugned
legislation. Its fundamental concern is to avoid paying money to those who will
be damaged if that desire to improve (local) public health is gratified in the
manner which the legislation envisages. Section 15(1) of the TPP Act provides:
"This Act does not apply to the extent (if any) that its operation would result in
an acquisition of property from a person otherwise than on just terms."
There is no provision for just terms in the TPP Act. Thus, faced with a choice
between protecting local public health at the price of compensating the
proprietors and not protecting local public health at all, the legislature chose
the latter course.
JTInt'1 SA, [2012] HCA 43
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not be able to be used. 4 1 Similarly, word marks will only be allowed if
used according to strict presentational rules. 4 2 On this issue, both
proponents of plain packaging and tobacco companies agree that
packaging is essential for the establishment and maintenance of
brands. 43 Indeed, this must be correct because the ability to
distinguish one trader's goods from another is the fundamental
purpose of trademarks. 44 This function of trademarks to distinguish
brands is arguably even more central to the trademark's function
when all products are similar, which seems to be the case with
cigarettes because many smokers are unable to distinguish between
similar cigarettes in testing.45 Also, if cigarette advertising is banned
(as is largely the case in Australia), the only place left where brand
distinction can be made is probably the cigarette packet. 46

41.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ss 20-21 (Austl.); Tobacco Plain
42.
Packaging Regulations 2011 (Cth) div 2.3 (Austl.). This is true whether or not a
particular stylized mark was considered misleading, unduly attractive, etc. because all
marks of this category are banned. The approach taken in the Australian statute is not
case-by-case but rather categorical, unlike say in Articles 6 or 7 of the Paris
Convention (concerning denials of registration of trademarks), or in TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 1, at art. 3 1(a) (concerning the compulsory licensing of patents).
OF

43.
See, e.g., QUIT VICTORIA & CANCER COUNCIL VICTORIA, PLAIN PACKAGING
TOBACCO PRODUCTS: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 3 (2011), available at

http://www.heartfoundation.org.aulSiteCollectionDocuments/Evidence-Paper-PlainPackaging.pdf ("The tobacco industry uses cigarette pack technologies and innovations
in design to communicate particular attributes about each brand. . . ."); M. Wakefield
et al., The Cigarette Pack as Image: New Evidence From Tobacco Industry Documents,
11
(Suppl.
I)
TOBACCO
CONTROL
i73,
i73
(2002),
available
at
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/cgi/content/abstract/11/suppLl/i73
("[P]ackaging must
play a more important role in establishing and driving brand image."). This study
refers to a Phillip Morris legacy study. JERRY ISSACS, IDENTIFIED HTI TEST OF
MARLBORO ULTRA LIGHTS IN A BLUE PACK VERSUS MARLBORO ULTRA LIGHTS IN A RED
PACK (PROJECT No. 1256/1257) (1981) (finding that smokers had a strong brand

preference for a particular color packaging); see also M. Wakefield & T. Letcher, My
Pack is Cuter Than Your Pack, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 154, 154-56 (2002) (discussing
tobacco companies' use of visual trademarks on packaging to create a strong brand
identity); J. Scheffels, A Difference That Makes a Difference: Young Adult Smokers'
Accounts of Cigarette Brands and Package Design, 17 TOBACCO CONTROL 118, 118
(2008) ("A number of recent studies of tobacco industry documents have exposed how
the industry for a long time has recognised and utilised branding and packaging design
in complementing and extending the imagery created by advertising.").
44.
There is a debate about whether forcing all packs to look alike, as the
Australian law seems to require, will reduce the ability to identify certain brands as
premium and thus reduce the price of cigarettes. Whether this will happen and what
its effect on youth smoking may be is not a matter on which this Article opines.
45.
See Wakefield et al., supra note 43, at i75 (providing the results of a study
that analyzed the relationship between smokers' brand preferences and tobacco
packaging).
46.
This is referred to in Andrew D. Mitchell's, Australia's Move to the Plain
Packagingof Cigarettesand Its WTO Compatibility,5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 405, 407 (2010) (explaining that plain packaging requirements will eliminate
the last avenue for cigarette marketing in Australia). See also N. Mawditt, Putting
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Australia's move to plain packaging is neither unexpected nor
without history. The legislation states that it is to give effect to the
WHO's FCTC.47
D. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)
and Evidence about PlainPackaging
The FCTC 48 was developed in response to concerns about the
continuing consumption of cigarettes even though the health risks
were widely known. 49 The FCTC and the guidelines to various
articles adopted under it have been used to justify plain packaging
measures.5 0 While the FCTC itself does not mention plain packaging,
Guidelines to the FCTC (the Guidelines) state that
Parties should consider adopting measures to restrict or prohibit the use of
logos, colours, brand images or promotional information on packaging other
than brand names and product names displayed in a standard colour and font
style (plain packaging). This may increase the noticeability and effectiveness of
health warnings and messages, prevent the package from detracting attention
from these, and address industry package design techniques that may suggest
5
that some products are less harmful than others. 1

Pack OpportunitiesBack into the Frame, 36 WORLD TOBACCO 212 (2006); Harry Clarke
& David Prentice, Will Plain Packaging Reduce Cigarette Consumption? 5 (La Trobe
University Sch. Of Econ., Working Paper No. 2012.03, 2012) ("The only major way
firms can now draw attention to the specific products they sell is by branding their
products . . . ."); Janet Hoek et al., Tobacco Branding, Plain Packaging, Pictorial
Warnings, and Symbolic Consumption, 22 QUAL. HEALTH RES. 630, 635 (2011)
("Stripping away brand imagery ... would disrupt and devalue the rich symbolic
properties users extrapolate from brands, thus diminishing the experience of
smoking.").
47.
Tobacco Plain PackagingAct 2011 (Cth) ss 3(1)(b), 12 (Austl.).
48.
World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
supra note 15; HISTORY OF THE WHO CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, supra note

27.
49.
According to the WHO, "The idea for an international instrument for
tobacco control was formally initiated in May 1995." The History of the WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, http://www.who.int/fctc/about/history/en/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013). By that time, studies in major medical journals had exposed the
risks. See, e.g., Richard Doll et al., Mortality in Relation to Smoking. 40 Years'
Observations on Male British Doctors, 309 BRIT. MED. J. 901, 909 (1994) (finding a link
between smoking and an increased mortality rate).
50.
The FCTC was invoked in justifying plain packaging legislation. See
Australia Approves Plain Packaging!, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ALLIANCE (Nov. 21,
2011),
http://www.fctc.org/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=622:
australia-passes-plain-packaging&catid=239:packaging-and-labelling&Itemid=243.
51.
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Elaboration of
Guidelines for Implementation of Article 11 of the Convention, 1 46, FCTC/COP/3/7
(Aug. 21, 2008) (emphasis added). For a discussion of these guidelines and the
guidelines for implementation of Article 13, see WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, Elaboration of Guidelines for Implementation of Article 13 of the
Convention, IT 15, 16 FCTC/COP/3/7 (Aug. 21, 2008), which provides:
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The FCTC and its Guidelines are definitely relevant as part of
context
in interpreting the application of the TRIPS Agreement to
the
plain packaging measures. 52 This Article discusses their role in
interpretation below.53
Legally speaking, no FCTC member has an obligation to apply
any of those Guidelines, nor do those Guidelines amend any of the
WTO instruments. FCTC members should thus balance those
Guidelines with other objectives and implement them in light of their
other legal obligations. That is precisely the point of this Article. Put
differently, this Article does not question that the Guidelines support
plain packaging and that some extend to the elimination of figurative
marks and the imposition of strict formats for word marks (brands).
However, it seems self-evident that though they are contextually
relevant, the Guidelines do not amount to a deletion of TRIPS
Agreement obligations both because the instrument was adopted in a
different context and because reference is made here to the

15. Packaging is an important element of advertising and promotion. Tobacco
pack or product features are used in various ways to attract consumers, to
promote products and cultivate and promote brand identity, for example by
using logos, colours, fonts, pictures, shapes and materials on or in packs or on
individual cigarettes or other tobacco products.
16. The effect of advertising or promotion on packaging can be eliminated by
requiring plain packaging: black and white or two other contrasting colours, as
prescribed by national authorities; nothing other than a brand name, a product
name and/or manufacturer's name, contact details and the quantity of product
in the packaging, without any logos or other features apart from health
warnings, tax marks and other government-mandated information or
markings; prescribed font style and size; and standardized shape, size and
materials. There should be no advertising or promotion inside or attached to
the package or on individual cigarettes or other tobacco products.
See also Kate Lannan, The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: The
International Context for Plain Packaging, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING
OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES 11, 21-23 (Tania Voon et al. eds., 2012) (discussing
Article 11 guidelines).
52.
The landmark dispute for allowing the use of non-WTO sources to interpret
WTO obligations is Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). As Frankel
explained:
In the Shrimp Turtle report, the Appellate Body considered other rules of
international law to interpret the phrase 'exhaustible natural resources' found
in Article XX(g) of GATT. The interpretation was necessary to consider the
legitimacy of the United States ban on the importation of shrimp that was
fished in a way that 'incidentally' killed sea turtles. In order to interpret the
phrase, the Panel and the Appellate Body referred to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in support of the conclusion that
natural resources included both living and non-living resources.
Frankel, supra note 10, at 424.
53.
See discussion infra Part V.
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Guidelines. As this Article discusses below, other WTO and WHO
members have taken a different approach to the policy "balancing
act" involved in determining how to implement plain packaging
measures. 54
Here, it may be useful to recall that there is conflicting evidence
over whether or to what extent plain packaging is (or will be)
effective. This Article's authors do not purport to be experts on the
FCTC or the Guidelines to that convention, nor do they intend here to
survey that evidence comprehensively or in detail (that full debate
must be had among relevant experts), or to determine which evidence
is more convincing. 55 Rather, this Article merely sets out an
illustrative sample of that evidence from different perspectives. In
2009, a study claimed plain packaging was very effective. 56 The study
concluded:
The evidence indicates three primary benefits of plain packaging:
increasing the effectiveness of health warnings, reducing false health
beliefs about cigarettes, and reducing brand appeal especially among
youth and young adults. Overall the research to date suggests that
"plain" packaging regulations would be an effective tobacco control
measure, particularly in jurisdictions with comprehensive restrictions
57
on other forms of marketing.

54.
See discussion infra notes 60 and 201 on the draft EU directive.
55.
The central concern of this Article is the accurate way to interpret the
TRIPS Agreement (and where relevant, other international agreements). The nature of
the plain packaging debate, however, compels us to inform the reader that we do not
like smoking and we particularly believe youth smoking should be actively
discouraged.
56.
David Hammond, "PlainPackaging"Regulations for Tobacco Products: The
Impact of Standardizing the Color and Design of Cigarette Packs, 52 Suppl. 2 SALUD
PUfBLICA DE MEXICO S226, S230 (2010), available at http://www.scielosp.org/pdf/spm/
v52s2/al8v52s2.pdf ("The evidence base in support of 'plain' and standardized
packaging is growing rapidly and consistently points to the potential benefit of plain
packaging. . . ."). Thanks to Matthew Maynard, student at Western Ontario Law
School, for directing Susy Frankel to this study.
57.
Id. at S226. For further studies on the effects of plain packaging regulation,
see PHILLIP MORRIS NEW ZEALAND LIMITED, PLAIN PACKAGING OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS
WILL NOT REDUCE SMOKING RATES, AND WILL VIOLATE NEW ZEALAND'S
INTERNATIONAL TRADE OBLIGATIONS: A RESPONSE TO THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH
CONSULTATION ON PLAIN PACKAGING OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS (2012), available at

http://www.pmi.comleng/tobacco-regulation/submissions/Documents/ExecutiveSumma
ryofPMNZsubmissionon-plain-packaging-final.pdf
Park Beede et al., The
Promotional Impact of Cigarette Packaging: A Study of Adolescent Responses to
Cigarette Plain-Packs (June 29, 1990) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://1egacy.library.ucsf.edultidlenu22e00/pdf;jsessionid=6A2392045A99ABl6386160
B18EEO3BE.tobacco03; Juliana Doxey & David Hammond, Deadly in Pink: The Impact
of Cigarette Packaging Among Young Women, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 353 (2011);
Richard Edwards, Plenary Address, Oceania Tobacco Control Conference, Oceania
Plenary Address: Tobacco Controlled-What Will It Take? (Oct. 18, 2011), available at
http://aspire2025.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/edwards-201 1-oceania-plenary-addresstobacco-controlled.pdf; Philip Gendall et al., Young Adults' Interpretationsof Tobacco

2013]

PLAIN PACKAGING AND TRIPS

1165

A 2013 study released in the United Kingdom suggested that plain
packaging was likely to lead to a small but not insignificant reduction
in smoking, especially among youth.58 Interestingly, a recent EU
proposal concerning tobacco packaging would not target cigars in the
same way as cigarettes (initially at least) because these products are
mainly consumed by older consumers.5 9 If adopted, that proposal
would not mandate plain packaging, but it would reduce the space
available for trademarks to less than 25 percent of the front and back
of the pack. 60
It has been argued that plain packaging may increase illicit
trade in tobacco, in part because it makes it cheaper to produce packs
(for any brand). 61 And another study concluded: "There is no
statistically significant direct relationship between PSA [pack space
appropriation] regulation. . . and licit tobacco consumption."62
As mentioned above, this Article does not opine on the value or
strength of this evidence and the different stances policy makers from

Brands: Implications for Tobacco Control, 13 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 911 (2011);
Guido Van Hal et al., Flemish Adolescents' Perceptions of CigarettePlain Packaging:A
Qualitative Study With Focus Group Discussions, 2 BMJ OPEN 1, 1 (2012); David
Hammond et al., The Effect of Cigarette Branding and Plain Packaging on Female
Youth in the United Kingdom, 52 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 151 (2012); Janet Hoek et al.,
Effects of Dissuasive Packaging on Young Adult Smokers, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 183
(2011); Hoek et al., Tobacco Branding, supra note 46; Crawford Moodie et al., Young
People's Perceptions of Cigarette Packagingand PlainPackaging:An Online Survey, 14
NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 98 (2011); Scheffels, supra note 43; Christine M. White et
al., The Potential Impact of Plain Packaging of Cigarette Products Among Brazilian
Young Women: An Experimental Study, 12 BMC PUB. HEALTH 737 (2012).
58.
The exact prediction is an overall decrease of 1 percent of the population
who smokes after two years. PlainPackagingof Tobacco Products Would Cut Smoking,
Experts Say, SCIENCE DAILY (Jan. 23, 2013), www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/01/
130123115354.htm?utm source=feedburner&utmmedium=feed&utmcampaign=Feed
%3A+sciencedaily%2Fliving-well+(ScienceDaily%3A+Living+Well+News).
59.
Commission Proposalfor a Directive of the EuropeanParliamentand of the
Council on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions
of the Member States Concerning the Manufacture, Presentationand Sale of Tobacco
and Related Products, at 7, COM (2012) 788 final (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter
Presentationand Sale of Tobacco and Related Products].
60.
See id. at arts. 8, 9(1)(c) (providing the minimum size of health warnings
(front, back, and side panels of packages)). The remaining space is left not only for
trademarks but also for stamp tax markings, unique identifiers, etc. under Articles
7(3), 7(5), and 14(8). The marks used in the available space should not be "false,
misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression ... ." Id. at art.
12(1)(a).
61.
See Alex Ralph, Plain Packaging 'Will Lead to Big Rise in Illicit Tobacco',
THE TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, at 31, available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/
("Any move to enforce nonttolbusiness/industries/consumer/article3665098.ece
branded cigarette packets risks boosting the trade in illicit tobacco .... .").
DELOITTE, TOBACCO PACKAGING REGULATION: AN INTERNATIONAL
62.
ASSESSMENT OF THE INTENDED AND UNINTENDED IMPACTS 4 (2001), available at
http://www.bat.com/group/sites/uk_3mnfen.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO8GHH3V/$FILE/
medMD8GHFFW.pdf?openelement (commissioned by British American Tobacco).
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various WTO members have taken. However, the purpose and
strength of this evidence and other evidence addressing the same and
similar issues is likely to be central to the interpretation of what
amounts to an unjustified encumbrance under TRIPS Agreement
Article 20, as this Article explains below. 63 Justification can be
advanced not only as a matter of theory (experts explaining why plain
packaging may or may not work) but also empirically. Given that the
WTO cases were delayed sufficiently to see the early impact of the
Australian legislation, empirical evidence may become available. 64 It
may be used to sway a panel on the application of the justification
test. The evidence would also be relevant to TRIPS Agreement Article
8, which is part of the context and object and purpose of Article 20,
because it refers to measures being necessary to protect public
health. 65 While necessity and justification are different notions, both
must be interpreted contextually as the next Part explains.
III. THE RULES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
The central rule of interpretation and key part of Article 31 of
the VCLT requires that
[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
66
and in the light of its object and purpose.

63.
Any encumbrance must not be unjustified. See TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 1, at art. 20 ("The use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be
unjustifiably encumbered .... ).
64.
See, e.g., Melanie Wakefield, Megan Bayly & Michelle Scollo, Product
Retrieval Time in Small Tobacco Retail Outlets Before and After the Australian Plain
Packaging Policy: Real-World Study, TOBAccO CONTROL (Sept. 25, 2013), available at
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2013/05/25/tobaccocontrol-2013050987.abstract (detailing a study on the change in cigarette package retrieval
following the plain packaging legislation in Australia).
65.
Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement requires necessity. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8; see also infra Part V.
66.
VCLT, supra note 5, at art. 31.1. Article 31 continues to explain context,
which is discussed further below. It provides:
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more of the parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
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This key provision begins with the rule that interpretation of a
treaty should be "in good faith."67 This somewhat broad concept may,
at first blush, seem to be so general as to be merely a "diplomatic"
gloss on hard(er) rules of treaty interpretation. It is, however, not an
abstract requirement. 68 While the operative parts of Article 31
("ordinary meaning" in context and the treaty's object and purpose)
are central to the analytical framework of this article, the good faith
requirement adds that these tools of interpretation should not be
used to reach an absurd or unreasonable result.6 9 What amounts to
such a rdsult will of course be specific to the facts and treaty at
issue. 70 In the context of trademarks and the TRIPS Agreement, a
good faith interpretation must at least require that the trademark
provisions are interpreted in light of their context and of the TRIPS
Agreement's object and purpose.
In interpreting treaty language, all aspects of Article 31.1 are
relevant. As explained above, the ordinary meaning of an article in a
treaty is discerned by looking not only at the words of the article in
question but also at that article's context and the object and purpose
of the treaty.7 1 Specific statements about object and purpose, whether
in a treaty's preamble or in other provisions, are relevant to context

(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.
Id. at art. 31.
67.
The TRIPS Agreement is not a self-standing treaty. However, it is part of a
treaty, as Annex IC of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
April 15, 1994. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1.
68
See SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 120 (noting that while good faith may seem
abstract, it is an objective criterion).
69.
Id.
70.
Commentators have suggested utilizing domestic law concepts in
international law. For example, see Mary E. Hiscock The Keeper of the Flame: Good
Faith and FairDealing in International Trade, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV 1059, 1066-67
(1996). Hiscock discusses how good faith can translate between domestic and
international law. In essence, she argues that the business efficacy test in contract law
has relevance internationally. See also Adam Kramer, Implication in Fact as an
Instance of ContractualInterpretation,63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 384, 408 (2004) (noting that
a duty of good faith applies in a such a way that is reasonable to expect given the
circumstances).
71.
See SINCLAIR, supranote 5, at 119 (noting that Article 31(1) requires treaty
terms to be given their ordinary meaning "in their context and in the light of [the
treaty's] object and purpose").
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and to object and purpose. 72 In the TRIPS Agreement, this includes
Article 8, which provides that
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations,
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition,...
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
73
Agreement.

A number of scholars have argued that there has been a
tendency for the WTO panels and the Appellate Body to interpret the
TRIPS Agreement in a rather rigid, formalistic way. 74 They argue
that, on the face of existing dispute settlement reports, the WTO's use
of the VCLT has not given due weight to the object and purpose of the
TRIPS Agreement and the purposes of intellectual property more
generally. 75 Additionally, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health expressly states that Articles 7 and 8
are relevant to interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. 76 An
apparent lack of attention to the object and purpose of the TRIPS
Agreement and the domestic policy aspirations of some of its
members have led those commentators and others to suggest broader
approaches to achieve a purposive interpretation.7 7

72.
See VILLIGER, supra note 5, at 428 ("Article 31 does not state where object
and purpose may be sought. Traditionally the preamble ... is resorted to, or a general
clause a he beginning of a treaty.").
73.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8 (emphasis added).
74.
Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, for example, describe the WTO dispute
settlement panel approach to interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement as formalistic
because of the way the panels look at isolated provisions rather than the package of
arrangements that led to the particular provision at issue. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Rochelle Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 96-98 (2004).
75.
See Frankel, supranote 10, at 396-97 (arguing that the WTO's reports lack
analysis regarding the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement); see also Peter K.
Yu, The Objectives and Principlesof the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1021
(2009) (arguing that the WTO has used Articles 7 and 8 concerning the object and
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement sparingly in decisions).
76.
The need for the application of interpretive principles to give full weight to
the TRIPS Agreement's objectives and principles contained in Articles 7 and 8 in
dispute- settlement was underscored in the Doha Declaration. See World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, 5.a, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2
[hereinafter Doha Declaration on Public Health] ("[E]ach provision of the TRIPS
Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement .... );
see also James T. Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 291, 292-93 (2002) ("[T]he Doha Declaration should now be regarded as an
interpretive element in the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement under customary
international law.").
77.
See generally GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY REGIME 14-16 (2012), where the authors suggest that greater attention
should be paid to domestic policy goals and the use of an international acquis of
intellectual property to give better interpretive effect to the TRIPS Agreement. Daya
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This Article does not disagree with the view that the WTO's
application of the VCLT rules may not have given the rules their full
effect and that the WTO's approach to interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement may at times seem unduly formalistic. Indeed, the
authors of this Article have made some of these arguments. 78
However, although the VCLT rules of interpretation can lead to a
formalistic approach, formalism is not the inevitable consequence of,
or the only approach under, the VCLT.7 9 Formalism may stem from
the fact that WTO panels and the Appellate Body seem particularly
conscious that their role is to interpret the agreements and not to add
to them or to modify the substance of negotiated concessions.8 0 That
is rightly so. However, this Article suggests that giving interpretive
effect to the context of an article and to the treaty's object and
purpose is not the same as adding to the TRIPS Agreement. Put
differently, if context and object and purpose are fully utilized, then
VCLT interpretation will potentially be less formalistic and can be
more purposive without modifying or adding to the negotiated WTO
texts.
While the VCLT embraces purpose, it has rules about what
sources can be used to identify that purpose. The primary rule is that
the words of the treaty must be interpreted according to their

Shanker, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Dispute Settlement System of
the WTO and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, 36(4) J. WORLD TRADE
721 (2002).
78.
See Frankel, supra note 10, at 397 (explaining that the WTO did not fully
discuss the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: DRAFrING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 62-63, 436-39 (4th ed. 2012).
79.
There are many approaches to interpretation even within the VCLT rules,
and there can be a tendency for a tribunal to emphasize one part of the rules over the
other depending on the aims of the tribunal and the nature of the agreement before it.
See generally Joost Pauwelyn & Manfred Elsig, The Politics of Treaty Interpretation:
Variations and Explanations Across International Tribunals, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 445 (Jeffrey L.

Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (discussing the various approaches to treaty
interpretation in different tribunals even when applying the VCLT).
DSU Article 3(2) provides:
80.
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members
recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members
under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
DSU, supra note 4, at art. 3(2). And Article 19(2) states, "[I]n their findings and
recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in the covered agreements." Id. at art. 19(2).
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ordinary meaning.8 1 The structure of Article 31.1 is precisely that the
context and object and purpose of the treaty are part of the ordinary
meaning exercise. 8 2 They are not meant to change the ordinary
meaning. Rather, they are tools to locate or discern the ordinary
meaning and inform proper interpretation.8 3
It is now beyond doubt that interpretation of a treaty must not
be treated as a mere "black letter" law exercise but rather as is a
much mtore nuanced and detailed process. 84 The WTO has explained
that the correct method of interpretation in accordance with Article
31 of the VCLT is a "holistic" approach:
The principles of interpretation that are set out in Articles 31 and 32
are to be followed in a holistic fashion. The interpretative exercise is
engaged so as to yield an interpretation that is harmonious and
coherent and fits comfortably in the treaty as a whole so as to render
the treaty provision legally effective. A word or term may have more
than one meaning or shade of meaning but the identification of such
meaning in isolation only commences the process of interpretation, it
does not conclude it. . . . Instead, a treaty interpreter is required to
have recourse to context and object and purpose to elucidate the
relevant meaning of the word or term. This logical progression provides
a framework for proper interpretative analysis. At the same time, it
should be kept in mind that treaty interpretation is an integrated
operation, where interpretative rules or principles must be understood
and applied as connected and mutually reinforcing components of a
85
holistic exercise.

The central concern of this Article is that some of the approaches
to treaty interpretation, which have emerged in the discussion about
the plain packaging of cigarettes, are not only an incorrect

81.
See VCLTsupra note 5, at art. 31.1 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
82.
Id.
83.
The VCLT expressly requires that the negotiating history not be used as a
primary source to determine the ordinary meaning but rather, in the second instance,
in order to confirm the ordinary meaning established under Article 31. See id. at art. 32
(noting that this type of history is a supplementary tool of interpretation).
84.
A black letter law approach is a literal approach without regard to context
or object and purpose and is not an appropriate approach to international treaty
interpretation. See VCLT, supranote 5, at art. 31; see also infra Part IV.B.2.
85.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology, 269, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009). This is an
antidumping case rather than a dispute under the TRIPS Agreement, but the
principles of VCLT interpretation apply equally to all international treaties including
WTO agreements. Indeed, the Appellate Body has said that the VCLT rules impose
certain common disciplines upon treaty interpreters irrespective of the content of the
treaty provision being examined and irrespective of the field of international law
concerned. Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Existence and
Application of Zeroing Methodology,
267, WTIDS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) (citing
Appellate Body Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan,1 60, WT/DS184/ABR (July 24, 2001)).
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interpretation of the meaning of articles of the TRIPS Agreement but
also that such approaches do violence to methods of treaty
interpretation with potentially deleterious effects on future
interpretation of TRIPS Agreement provisions, the rules-based
dispute-settlement system, and even the stability of the WTO
agreements. The authors of this Article do not dispute that there will
be differences of interpretation when using the VCLT. However, a
dispute over interpretation within a rules-based system is different
from a dispute where some arguments defy the agreed and
established method of interpretation.

IV. TRADEMARK

RIGHTS

At the center of the debate over whether plain packaging is
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement is the scope of its minimum
standards that WTO members must provide in their domestic
trademark laws. The key provisions about trademarks are found in
the Paris Agreement for the Protection of Industrial Property (the
Paris Convention), 86 which is incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement. 87 The TRIPS Agreement's substantive trademark
minimum standards are found in Articles 15-21 in the part of the
TRIPS Agreement under the heading "Standards concerning the
availability, scope and use of Intellectual Property Rights."8 8 The
broad framework of those provisions is to provide standards for the
subject matter of trademarks (Article 15); the exclusive rights of
trademark owners (Article 16); exceptions to the rights conferred by a
trademark (Article 17); and other articles relating to the term of
protection, requirements of use, and licensing.8 9 As mentioned above
and detailed further below, Article 20 is key to the issues of plain
packaging. This is why it is the central focus of this Article's VCLT
analysis.90 Therefore, this Article first discusses Article 20 and then
considers the other articles, as the VCLT requires, as part of the
context of Article 20.

A. The Nature of the Article 20 Obligation
According to Article 20, the use of a trademark in the course of
trade shall not be "unjustifiably encumbered" by special

86.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967,
828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 9(1).
87.
Id. at arts. 15-21.
88.
Id. at arts. 18, 19, 21.
89.
90.
This Article does not address a possible direct role for Article 16. See supra
note 16.
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requirements, such as use with another trademark, use in a special
form, or use in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish
the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings.9 1 This provision seems to presuppose some form of use
(otherwise why would the TRIPS Agreement prohibit certain
encumbrances). Some have argued, as this Article has discussed
above, that because the TRIPS Agreement does not contain a full or
explicit right to use, the issue of use is irrelevant. This Article
disagrees with this view. The matter is not binary: full right to use or
no interest in use at all. One must look at Article 20 in context to
understand how and to what extent use is relevant.
Beginning with the language of Article 20, to encumber is to
"hamper, impede, or burden." 92 As a starting point to VCLT
interpretation, based on the ordinary meaning of the words, a
measure completely preventing the use of a trademark (or any
measure tantamount thereto) encumbers the trademark's capability
to distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of
other undertakings.9 3
Some have argued that Article 20 can be interpreted to prohibit
small(er) scale encumbrances on the use of trademarks (e.g., use in a
special form) but not measures tantamount to a complete ban. 94 Can
91.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 20.
92.
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
61832?rskey=IjAcOE&result=2#eid (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
93.
It has been argued, however, that a complete ban is not covered under
Article 20. See, e.g., Benn McGrady, TRIPS and Trademarks: The Case of Tobacco, 3(1)
WORLD TRADE REV. 53, 62-63 (2004).
94.
For example, see Mark Davison, The Legitimacy of Plain Packaging Under
InternationalIntellectual Property Law: Why There Is No Right to Use a Trademark
Under Either the Paris Convention or the TRIPS Agreement, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND
PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 51, at 81, 94-95, which
states:
There are two basic competing views of what it means to encumber the use of a
trademark for the purposes of Article 20. The first, broad view is that a total
prohibition on use constitutes an encumbrance by special requirements. The
alternative, narrow view is that an encumbrance can only be some form of
positive requirement about how a trademark is used, not a ban on use. Much
has been said about these two views by way of the application of standard
principles of interpretation of international treaties, and by simply considering
the nature of the word 'encumbered' in isolation from other provisions in the
TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention and, indeed, in isolation from the
related wording in Article 20 [...] One difficulty with this approach is that the
relevant interpretation issue is not just the meaning of the word 'encumbered'
but the meaning of the entire expression 'encumbered by special requirements'.
Tobacco advocates repeatedly focus on the meaning of 'encumbered' and ignore
the requirement to interpret the relevant provision, not just one word within it.
'Encumbered by special requirements' is a quite specific indication of the
nature of the encumbrance. Moreover, the four examples of special
requirements given by Article 20 generate an ejusdem generis in which 'special
requirements' constituting the encumbrance are requirements relating to
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this be so? The policy underpinning and the articulated words of
Article 20 suggest that certain measures are ultimately to the
detriment of the ability of a trademark to distinguish its goods or
services. It would seem to follow from this that interpreting Article 20
as not applying to complete bans is not obvious or apparent from the
ordinary meaning. 95 Put differently, a panel (or the Appellate Body)
would have to find that a complete prohibition is not an encumbrance
because it is something different but is more than an encumbrance. 96
An argument advanced for allowing complete bans but
prohibiting smaller encumbrances seems to be that because Article 20
refers to "use," it is not applicable when there is no use because there
is a complete ban on use. That approach also seems exceedingly
literal and noncontextual. It does not lead to a reasonable result and
thus is inconsistent with recognized treaty interpretation principles.
Indeed, it resembles an argument that was unsuccessfully made
at the WTO about the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) 9 7-namely, whether a "total prohibition" of online gambling

actual use, not partial or total prohibition of use. Thus, Article 20 applies only
to positive requirements regulating the use of a trademark, not partial or total
prohibitions of the use of a trademark.
This argument is given some weight by Tania Voon and Andrew Mitchell who state
that "[s]ome uncertainty exists regarding whether plain packaging 'encumber[s]' the
use of trade mark by 'special requirements'." See Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Face
Off: Assessing WTO Challenges to Australia's Scheme for Plain Tobacco Packaging, 22
PUB. L. REV. 218, 236 (2011). They then conclude on the same page that the "key
question is whether the encumbrance is justifiable" and then proceed to discuss that
point. Id. at 235-40. This discussion is also found in Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell,
Implications of WTO Law for Plain Packagingof Tobacco Products, in PUBLIC HEALTH
AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES supra, note 51, at 109, 119-29,

and Submission by Associate Professors Andrew Mitchell and Tania Voon to the
Inquiry into Tobacco Plain Packaging by the House Committee on Health and Ageing
(Submission No. 30 (Plain Packaging Bill), July 25, 2011) 11-13. However, in Mitchell,
supra note 46, at 418, the author says, "In any case, it appears that plain packaging is
clearly an encumbrance within the meaning of Article 20."
95.
See JUrg Simon, TRIPS Article 20, in CONCISE INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN

IP

LAw: TRIPS,

PARIS CONVENTION,

EUROPEAN

ENFORCEMENT AND

TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 58 (Thomas Cottier & Pierre V~ron eds., 2008) ("Art. 20
protects the integrity of trademarks, . . . especially their ability to distinguish the goods
and services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings."). Additionally, the
advocates of this argument now seem to agree that Article 20 does apply. The issue is
thus whether there is justification for the encumbrance.
96.
As discussed infra Part IV.B.2, the rights provided in Article 16 (against
unauthorized third-party use of a protected mark) make little sense if the trademark
owner cannot use the mark. Presumably, use by the third party would be illegal under
the ban on use of the mark and action for violating that ban could be taken by the state
that banned such mark. See infra Part IV.B.2.
97.
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 15 April 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), Annex 1B,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 UNTS. 183 [hereinafter GATS].
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services could amount to a limitation on market access.9 8 In that
instance, the argument was that because the relevant market-access
part of GATS refers to "limitations on the number" it could not apply
to a prohibition that did not provide a numerical quota but was
effectively zero.9 9 The Appellate Body regarded that interpretation as
too literal and found that the object and purpose of GATS did not
require a specific form of the limitation.10 0 What was important was
the effect of the limitation. 101 Here, it is reasonable that an
interpretation of Article 20 give effect to the object and purpose of
Article 20-namely, to prevent unjustified encumbrances on
trademark use. 102 Whether any encumbrance is unjustified is a
separate question, which is discussed below.
As noted above, a principle of interpretation is that when two (or
more) interpretations are possible, preference should be given to the
one that supports the object and purpose of the treaty, in the sense of
making the treaty effective, and is made in good faith. The good faith
principle should be an objective principle of interpretation, not an
abstract notion, and should not lead to a result that is either
"manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 0 3 This principle supports this
Article's preferred interpretation of Article 20. To interpret Article 20
as prohibiting some encumbrances, but not complete bans, would be
to choose an interpretation that does not support the object and
purpose of the trademark provisions of the TRIPS Agreement-to
encourage the use of trademarks in the course of trade-and is
arguably unreasonable because, as above, it would permit something
more than an encumbrance. It would permit the greater but not the
lesser harm.104
Continuing the reading of Article 20, the requirement must also
be "special" for it to fall under Article 20's purview. The term special
was interpreted in relation to TRIPS Article 13 in the WTO Panel
Report, United States-Article 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,10 5 as

Appellate Body Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-Border
98.
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, T 373(A)(i), WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
233-37.
Id.
99.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
The object and purpose of an individual article is relevant under VCLT
rules to the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole. See Appellate Body Report,
European Communities-Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts,
238-39, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R (Sept. 12, 2005).
103.
SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 120.
104.
In addition to a ban on the use of certain types of trademarks, plain
packaging measures may also impose a special form of trademarks that are permitted.
This is an encumbrance within the meaning of Article 20.
105.
Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
6.109, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) (adopted July 27, 2000) [hereinafter Section
110(5) Panel Report].
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"having an individual or limited application or purpose ; "containing
details; precise, specific"; "exceptional in quality or degree; unusual;
out of the ordinary"; or "distinctive in some way."' 0 6 The word special
in Article 20 qualifies requirements.0 7 These requirements may well
include requirements outside of trademark law. Whereas, the word
special in Article 13 qualifies cases, which are cases within copyright
law.
Can the word special in Article 20 in some sense have a broader
meaning than in Article 13 and would that modify the outcome of the
analysis? Where a WTO panel has previously interpreted the same
word in the same agreement, it likely will take that definition into
account in future cases. However, in United States-Article 110(5) of
the US Copyright Act, the panel considered the various meanings of
special in the Oxford English Dictionary,0 8 which might give another
panel some leeway when the term is recontextualized as it arguably
should be here. In any event, a requirement applicable only or
primarily to trademark use on tobacco packaging would likely fall
within any reasonable definition of special; such a requirement would
certainly seem to have "limited application or purpose" and contain
"details; [be] precise, specific."' 0 9
The next step is to consider how the words of Article 20 embody
the function of trademarks in the course of trade, a concept with
strong origins in national trademark doctrines. When interpreting
Article 20, the domestic law traditions of any one party to the TRIPS
Agreement will not necessarily be determinative. State practice,
however, may be relevant to determining the ordinary meaning of
terms incorporated in the agreement when those terms were known
to have an agreed meaning, and even an object and purpose,
reflective of domestic law.110
The original tort of "passing off' prevented a merchant from
putting another's mark on his wares."' At common law, the existence
of protection depended on use in commerce by the plaintiff.112 Modern
trademark theory has recognized that trademarks protect not only
the owners of marks but also benefit consumers, especially by

106.
Id.
107.
TRIPS Agreement, supranote 1, at art. 20.
108.
Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 105, 6.109.
109.
Id.
110.
State practice subsequent to the entering into force of the TRIPS
Agreement might also be relevant to VCLT interpretation if it "establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." See VCLT, supra note 5, at
art. 31.3(b).
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling New
111.
ExtraterritorialReach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REV. 483, 542-43 (2003).
112.
See Aneta Ferguson, The Trademark Filing Trap, 49 IDEA 197, 224 (2009)
(noting that "a trademark is primarily a common law right acquired through use in
commerce and thus protected under the common law").
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reducing search costs. 113 Trademarks allow consumers to identify
lawful products that they wish to purchase and to expect a certain
quality that they associate with a given trademark. 114 This is said to
be an incentive for the trademark owner to maintain its brand.1 15
Making all packages more or less similar impairs this function of
trademarks. 1 16 This is arguably a situation that Article 20 and the
TRIPS Agreement trademark section more generally were meant to
constrain by making it subject to a justifiability test.
The international situation is admittedly complex because of the
different approaches to trademark protection in different countries.
In countries with a civil law system, registration of a mark is the
legal act that confers rights.1 17 Unregistered marks are not protected
as such, although remedies are often available under general rules
concerning unfair or parasitic competition.118 In Anglo-American
common law systems, trademark law originated as the judicially
created tort of passing off." 9 Registration is not required to obtain

113.
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 185-86 (2003) (analyzing how the presence of
trademarks allows for consumers to readily discern the producer of a good).
114.
A similar point is made by the High Court of Australia in the decision
about plain packaging and constitutional compensation. See JT Int'1 SA v
Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 T 31 (Austl.):
At common law, the property interest associated with a trademark was derived
from the goodwill of the business which used it. However, the rights conferred
by successive Commonwealth statutes on the holders of registered trademarks
have always been 'a species of property of the person whom the statute
describes as its registered proprietor'. Those rights are the exclusive rights to
use the trademark and to authorise other persons to use the trademark in
relation to the goods andlor services in respect of which the trademark is
registered. They are capable of assignment and transmission and attract
equities which 'may be enforced in the like manner as in respect of any other
personal property.' Their existence is conditioned upon satisfaction of
requirements for registration. They can cease to exist by operation of statutory
mechanisms such as rectification, removal from the register, or failure to
renew.
115.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 113, at 185-86.
116.
As noted above, both those in favor of and those against plain packaging
agree that plain packaging impairs trademark functions. See supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text.
117.
See Nguyen, supra note 111, at 542 ("[C]ivil law countries grant trademark
protection based on registration.").
118.
In France, such protection is based upon Article 1382 of the Civil Code. See
ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 28 (1997). For Germany, see
Christian Schertz & Susanne Bergmann, Germany, in CHARACTER MERCHANDISING IN
EUROPE, 136-37 (Heijo Ruijsenaars ed., 2003).
119.
See CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, THE LAW OF PASSING-OFF: UNFAIR
COMPETITION BY MISREPRESENTATION 23-30 (3d ed. 2004) (outlining the history of the
tort of passing off and how it slowly evolved to protect the importance of a propriety
right).
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relief under tort law.12 0 While registration of trademarks is possible
in most if not all common law jurisdictions, it is usually considered
more as "confirmation of title," though one that typically broadens the
scope of the holder's rights. 121 Where registration for intended use is
possible, it only creates inchoate rights (which may in some
circumstances nonetheless be enforceable) because in common law
systems rights in a trademark typically arise from use. 122 Prohibiting
use (on products the sale of which is legal) may amount in principle at
least to denying the possibility of obtaining and maintaining
protection. To utilize the language of Article 20, prohibiting use is
thus an "encumbrance." Use is thus undeniably relevant under
domestic law and affects the existence and scope of trademark rights.
In light of the foregoing analysis, it seems reasonable to conclude
that Article 20 scrutiny does apply to measures that prevent
trademarks from performing their functions considered as an
encumbrance by special requirement. Article 20 contains a positive
obligation on members of the TRIPS Agreement not to have laws that
unjustifiably encumber the use of trademarks, as even those who
have advocated a literal interpretation agree.12 3
Once it is concluded that a plain packaging measure is an
encumbrance by special requirement and therefore falls within the
ambit of Article 20, the next question is whether the "use of a
trademark is . . . unjustifiably encumbered," a matter that this Article
discusses further in subparts IV.B, C, and D.

120.
See Wayne Covell, Moove: The "Experiment" That Went Wrong, 82
TRADEMARK REP. 341, 368-69 (1992) (explaining that registration statutes evolved
from the tort known as passing off, which required a showing of deception that
amounted to a misrepresentation and did not require registration).
121.
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 19:1.75 (4th ed. 2013) ("[R]egistration in the U.S. does not create the
trademark, the owner creates the underlying right though use in the marketplace. In
the marketplace, consumers use the designation as a mark to identify and distinguish
source. Registration adds additional rights to the trademark property that already
exists."). For example, while passing off is only actionable where the initial (or senior)
mark was known and used, registration may allow the holder to sue users of infringing
marks throughout the country or region where the mark is registered. Additional
remedies (for example treble damages in U.S. law) may also be available for registered
marks. Id. § 19.9.
122.
Because of the difference in common law and civil law approaches, both are
recognized in the TRIPS Agreement.
123.
See Mitchell, supra note 46, at 418. He states, "Plain packaging is likely to
fall within the scope of Article 20, because it constitutes a special requirement
encumbrance."
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B. Use and Article 20 in Context
The immediate1 24 context of Article 20 is the other trademark
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the relevant Paris
Convention provisions incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. 1 25
This Article takes the view, based on the analysis in the previous
subpart, that Article 20 should not be read the same way if it stood by
itself as the only provision dealing with trademarks in the TRIPS
Agreement. Other provisions in the trademark section and in the
TRIPS Agreement as -a whole, as well as its status as a WTO
agreement, inform its proper interpretation.
1.

Registration vs. Use

Article 15 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that members
provide a system for registering trademarks. It does this through
defining the scope of the subject matter of trademarks and some
conditions of registrability. Article 15.4 of the TRIPS Agreement
states that the "nature of the goods or services to which a trademark
is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the
trademark." As such, measures preventing the registration of a
trademark because it is used in relation to tobacco products would
likely violate the TRIPS Agreement and Article 7 of the Paris
Convention, which provides that the "nature of the goods to which a
trademark is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to the
registration of the mark." 126
Is an obligation to allow registration the full extent of the Paris
Convention and TRIPS Agreement, or should more be said? The
TRIPS Agreement does not provide a full trademark code. However, if
read as an entire document while taking its object and purpose into
account, it does provide guidance as to WTO members' shared
understandings of the policies and norms relevant to trademarks. 127

124.
This Article says "immediate" because the context also includes the whole
of the TRIPS Agreement, particularly Article 8, discussed in Part V below, and the
context of the TRIPS Agreement as part of the WTO agreements, discussed in Part IV
below. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8; see infra Parts IV-V. These are also
relevant to the object and purpose discussion required under VCLT rules.
125.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 2.1 (incorporating into the TRIPS
Agreement parts of the Paris Convention).
126.
Paris Convention, supra note 86, at art. 7.
127.
The members shared understanding might also be described as the
intention of the parties to the agreement. The VCLT method of interpretation is a set of
rules that are a method of elucidating the intention of the parties. See generally
Gardiner, supra note 5; VILLIGER, supra note 5, at 415-49 (commenting on the VCLT
method). Importantly, the WTO has chosen the VCLT rules as the method of looking
for the intention of the parties, such as looking at subjective approaches in the travaux
prdparatoires (preparatory works). Article 32 of the VCLT makes it clear that the
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For instance, the function of trademarks can be understood by
reference to Article 15.1, especially its first sentence, which refers to
distinguishing goods and services of undertakings in the course of
trade. 2 8 Trademark owners have an undeniably legitimate interest
in preserving the distinctiveness, or capacity to distinguish, of their
marks so that the trademarks can perform that function, a principle
that finds an echo in Articles 15 and 20. This includes an interest in
using their "own trademark in connection with the relevant goods
and services" of their own and authorized undertakings and
licensees.' 2 9
Some authors have said that there is no violation of Article 15
because plain packaging laws do not prevent registration of
trademarks but only prevent their use.130 That is literally true, but it
is not the full picture. It may not fully deal with how Article 15 is
relevant context for the interpretation of Article 20 131 and
consequently is not what the WTO has in previous dispute settlement
reports described as a holistic interpretation. 132 The purpose of
registering trademarks is relevant context for a full and accurate
VCLT interpretation of Article 20 (and Article 15). Although a
trademark that is prohibited from being used on packaging can be
registered, the real point is why would any trademark owner register,
or maintain a registration of, a trademark that it cannot use? Even if,
as some commentators have suggested, this sometimes occurs, it is

travaux prdparatoiresare relevant but not the prime interpretive tool. VCLT, supra
note 5, at art. 32.
Article 15.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
128.
Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable
of constituting a trademark. Such signs, in particular words including personal
names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and combinations of colours as
well as any combination of such signs, shall be eligible for registration as
trademarks. Where signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the
relevant goods or services, Members may make registrability depend on
distinctiveness acquired through use. Members may require, as a condition of
registration, that signs be visually perceptible.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 15.1.
129.
Panel Report, European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Complaint by the
United States 1 7.664, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter European
Communities Trademarks Panel Report].
See e.g., Voon & Mitchell, Face Off, supra note 94, 113-15 (arguing that
130.
"Article 15.4 ... cannot be interpreted as preventing a Member from limiting or
prohibiting the use of trademarks").
If another article of the TRIPS Agreement was being interpreted, such as
131.
Article 16, then Article 20 would be relevant context to the interpretation of Articlel6.
See supraPart IV.C.
See supra Part III and in particular supra notes 84-85 and accompanying
132.
text (discussing the rules of interpretation).

1180

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:1149

not usual practice or indeed the object and purpose of Article 15 or
the TRIPS Agreement. As discussed above, the purpose of the TRIPS
Agreement regime is not to allow registration of trademarks simply
for the sake of registration. 3 3 Trademarks are typically registered so
that they can be used.134 Put differently, it is relevant in an analysis
guided by object and purpose to ask why the TRIPS Agreement gives
trademark owners a right to access a registration system and rights
against use by third parties to understand the trademark provisions
of the TRIPS Agreement.
Further, Article 19.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that if
"use is required to maintain a registration, the registration may be
cancelled only after an uninterrupted period of at least three years of
non-use, unless valid reasons based on the existence of obstacles to
such use are shown by the trademark owner." The article continues:
"Circumstances arising independently of the will of the owner of the
trademark which constitute an obstacle to the use of the trademark,
such as import restrictions on or other government requirements for
goods or services protected by the trademark, shall be recognized as
valid reasons for non-use."13 5 The combination of a (positive) right to
register independently of the nature of the product (assuming that
use of the product in commerce is legal) and of the maintenance of
registration in spite of measures that may bar use of the trademark
arguably point to-though admittedly not explicitly-those measures
being of a temporary nature. Registration is maintained because use
will start or resume at some point in the future. This interpretation is
further supported-though only indirectly-by Article 21, according
to which WTO members may not allow a third party not having the
owner's consent to use a trademark.1 36

133.
See supraPart III.
134.
Trademarks are occasionally registered in some jurisdictions for other socalled defensive purposes, but those instances are minimal and also subject to
challenge for non-use. See Yasuhiro H. Suzuki, Navigating The "Land of Harmony" and
Finding "Harmonization"for Foreign Trademark Applicants and Owners: A Japanese
Practitioner'sPerspective, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 519, 562 (2013) (describing the
requirements for defensive mark registration).
135.
See Appellate Body Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, $ 190-95, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) (acknowledging
that Article 19.1 addresses situations when domestic legislation requires use of a
trademark in order to maintain registration).
136.
Article 21 provides:
Members may determine conditions on the licensing and assignment of
trademarks, it being understood that the compulsory licensing of trademarks
shall not be permitted and that the owner of a registered trademark shall have
the right to assign the trademark with or without the transfer of the business
to which the trademark belongs.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 21.
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Because VCLT ruleS137 require that the trademark section of the
TRIPS Agreement provides context to understand and interpret
Article 20, then the purpose of registration and the rules regulating
the maintenance of registration are contextual arguments relevant to
the interpretation of Article 20. To be clear, this Article does not
suggest that recognizing why trademark owners register and
maintain their registrations is itself a reason for saying trademark
owners have carte blanche to use their trademarks or, in legal terms,
some form of an absolute right to use. This Article's suggestion is that
just because there is no explicit right to use in the TRIPS Agreement
does not mean one can ignore TRIPS Agreement articles that provide
context. This Article's conclusions on this point are simple: (a) the
purpose of registration is an integral aspect of interpreting the TRIPS
Agreement's provisions about trademarks; (b) the purpose and acquis
of the TRIPS Agreement registration provisions and Paris
Convention provisions incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement are to
encourage the orderly use of trademarks in commerce; and (c) the
rights of trademark owners are limited, but they make little sense if
seen as mere rights to exclude. Use of marks is, to use a WTO
analogy, like free trade. There is no full explicit right to trade freely
in any WTO document, and there are real limits to a member's ability
to trade freely with other members. Public health may justify
restrictions to trade under GATT Article XX for example. 138 Yet,
liberalizing trade (in order to increase trade) is the core normative
underpinning of the WTO system and of the GATT before it. 139
Members do not negotiate tariffs or try to limit nontariff barriers just
so that they can be registered on schedules.1 40 Though the analogy is
imperfect, the same may be said of use in trademark law. There is no
explicit right to use, and members can impose limits on such use, but
use of marks in commerce is the basis for trademark laws-unlike
other intellectual property rights, in particular copyright and patents,
which can be protected for their full term of protection (life of the
author plus 50 years for copyright; 20 years from filing for patents)
without any use of the copyrighted work or patented invention. 141
The first sentence of Article 20 demonstrates that trademarks are
normally used in commerce. 142 Otherwise, there would be no need to
limit the power of WTO members to "encumber" such use.

137.
See VCLT, supra note 5, at art. 31.1.
138.
See SCHOENBAUM & MATSUSHITA, supra note 3, at 920-21 (examining the
extent to which Article XX(b) protects health).
139.
See id. at 1-3 (noting that the GATT was created to lower tariffs).
140.
Id.
141.
See infra note 178.
142.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 20 ("The use of a trademark in
the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements, such
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Exclusive Rights

Another element of Article 20's context is Article 16, which sets
out trademark owners' exclusive rights against infringers. 143 As just
mentioned, the absence of an explicit right to use a trademark only
tells part of the story-namely, that there evidently is no absolute
right to use, but that is far from a complete answer. First, the nature
of property is such that it often utilizes the framework of rights to
exclude in order to give parameters to what the property owner and
others may or may not do. 144 Indeed, the ability to exclude others
from the property is frequently a touchstone of what makes
something property. 145 Second, the absence of an explicit right to use
is a feature common to most property rights, whether the property is
intellectual, personal, or real property. 14 6
The absence of an express statement in the TRIPS Agreement of
a right to use has given rise to two simple but incorrect arguments
about the TRIPS Agreement's interpretation. Broadly those
arguments are:
-All trademark rights and interests must be expressed in the
text of the TRIPS Agreement. If they are not so expressed
they must be implied. They cannot be implied so they do not
exist.147

as ... use in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods or services
of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.").
143.
See id. at art. 16 (describing the right of an owner to prevent unauthorized
use of a trademark).
144.
See generally Lyria Bennett Moses, The Applicability of Property Law in
New Contexts: From Cells to Cyberspace, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 639, 641 (2008) (giving a
useful summary of the many meanings of property).
145.
The ability to exclude others is a core feature of what makes property.
Some scholars argue that the right to exclude is a defining feature of property. Carol
Rose describes exclusion as the paradigm example of property. See Carol M. Rose, The
Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 145 (1998). An ability to exclude is not absolute.
There are many possible examples, such as in many jurisdictions customers cannot be
excluded from shops on racial grounds. There is some considerable debate about the
limits of exclusion as a touchstone of property law. See generally GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PETALVER, AN INTRODUCTION To PROPERTY THEORY 13055 (2012).
See discussion infra note 171.
146.
See, e.g., Davison, supra note 94, at 85-90 (stating that the right to use a
147.
trademark is not implied); see also Mark Davison, PlainPackaging of Tobacco and the
"Right" to Use a Trademark, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 498, 499 (2012) (rejecting
arguments that there is a right to use).
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-Because trademarks' exclusive rights can be characterized as
negative rights, there can be no positive rights of trademark
owners at all, including to use. 148
While it is correct that an interpreter of the TRIPS Agreement,
or any international agreement, should not add to the text of it,149 the
problem with the first argument is that it seems to ignore the treaty
interpretation rules of the VCLT in that it applies a literal, or black
letter law, interpretation in complete isolation from context and
object and purpose. In some instances, those analyzes may end up at
the same place, but not always. What matters here is the interpretive
process. This is one reason why international treaty interpretation
rules are so important: if such rules are ignored, the rules-based
system risks its very legitimacy.
The TRIPS Agreement is an international agreement setting out
minimum standards that must be enacted in domestic law. 150
Applying the customary rules of treaty interpretation, it should be
interpreted as such. Put differently, the TRIPS Agreement is not a
domestic law statute, and, therefore, one should expect that it is less
detailed than a domestic statute.1 5 ' If express words are missing from
a minimum standards treaty, then the absence of express words
should not be used to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
Interpretation of ordinary meaning under the VCLT does not allow
reading in words where they do not exist, but it does require
interpretation in light of the context and object and purpose of the
treaty. 152 That requires more than an exclusively literal
interpretation of individual parts of the TRIPS Agreement.
The problem with the second line of argument is that its
simplicity ignores property law and theory in two key ways. First, the

148.
See, e.g., Voon & Mitchell, Face Off, supra note 94, at 234-36 ("Thus,
trademark rights are negative rights: 'rights to exclude rather than rights to use'." And
"[a] footnote to this statement confirms that 'Article 16.1 of the TRIPS Agreement only
provides for a negative right to prevent all third parties from using signs in certain
circumstances'. (citing Panel Report, European Communities-Protection of
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs,
Complaint by Australia, WT/DS290/R (Mar. 15, 2005)) [hereinafter Australia Panel
Report]). This is not a matter of mere semantics or a happy coincidence (from the
perspective of the government of Australia and like-minded countries) when it comes to
applying the TRIPS Agreement to plain packaging: the TRIPS Agreement generally
frames trade mark and other IP rights as negative rights precisely to allow Members to
pursue legitimate non-IP-related public policies such as promoting public health.").
149.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
150.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 1.1 (stating such a purpose).
151.
The TRIPS Agreement provides the minimum standard that countries
enact in their laws. The details of enactment in national legislations are left to the
country to decide, provided the minimum standard is met. Id.
152.
See VCLT, supra note 5, at art. 31 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context in the light of its object and purpose.").
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notion of negative rights (that is, the right to exclude others) is
predominantly a definitional methodology of delineating property
rather than a substantive means of defining what the owner of
property may or may not do with the property.15 3 Second, there is an
inseparable relationship between rights to exclude (negative) and
legitimate interests (positive).154
In light of the above analysis, to argue, as some have done, that
the legitimate interests of trademark owners are exactly the same as,
and limited to, the Article 16 rights granted in the TRIPS
Agreement-thereby excluding any legally cognizable interest in
using their trademark-strikes the authors as unconvincing.1 55 In
sum, trademark rights matter in the plain packaging debate. The
debate is more nuanced and complex than the simple (and in this
Article's view inaccurate) suggestion that because trademark owners'
rights against third parties are generally expressed as (negative)
rights to exclude, trademark owners do not have legitimate and
legally relevant interests 156 to use their trademarks beyond
registration. This Article now looks deeper into the negative-rights
argument.
C. The Negative-Rights Argument in Context
The rights in Article 16 make sense in light of their object and
purpose-that is, when seen teleologically as allowing for the orderly
use of trademarks in commerce.' 5 7 This seems fairly obvious-How
else would a consumer be confused if the legitimate owner does not
use the trademark at some relevant point in time? As discussed
153.
See infra Part IV.C.
154.
See infra Part IV.C.
155.
See Mark Davison & Patrick Emerton, Rights, Privileges, Legitimate
Interests, and Justifiability: Article 20 of TRIPS and Plain Packaging of Tobacco
(forthcoming 2013), available at www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2322043#!. Davison and Emerton take issue with this Article's use of "legitimate
interests". At page 12 they acknowledge that the phrase "legitimate interests" is used
in the TRIPS Agreement, but they equate the TRIPS Agreement usage to only mean
what Article 16 protects. They state, "[T]here may be a legitimate interest in using a
trademark" and seek to distinguish this from a "legitimate interest to use a
trademark." Id. (relying on JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 182 (1986). First,
aspects of Raz's overall approach are contested. For example, see Jeremy Waldron,
Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097
(1988-1989). Second, the recognition of legitimate interests that fall short of an
absolute right (this Article's analysis) is perfectly consistent with Raz's view. Finally,
as noted, this Article discusses property because it shows the negative-rights label
neither fully addresses nor effectively answers the plain packaging issues because, as
noted above, commentators have suggested it does. See supra note 148. See also
discussion infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
156.
This Article uses the phrase legitimate interests as it mirrors the TRIPS
Agreement. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17; see infra Part IV.D.
157.
See infra Part IV.C.2.
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above, this Article contends that people do not register trademarks to
obtain a certificate from a government; they register them because
they are using the trademark in commerce (or intend to) and will
then need to maintain order.
This Article also suggests that trademark rights are best viewed
as a continuum. At one end of the spectrum would be an almost
absolute positive right to use a protected mark in any context, an
approach that is unrealistic and that this Article squarely rejects. At
the other end of the spectrum is a total ban on the use of a mark. At
that point, the (negative 158) rights to exclude third parties are
essentially irrelevant because (a) even the legitimate owner of the
mark cannot use his or her own mark; and (b) a third party using the
mark in relation to the relevant goods or services would also be
violating the government-imposed ban.
Looking at Section 2 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement
structurally, Article 16 provides the rights that the trademark owner
has against third parties that use his or her mark without
authorization, including counterfeiters. 159 Those rights are by no
means absolute. For example, they are limited by the need to show
consumer confusion.1 60 Moreover, Article 17 allows WTO members to
limit trademark owners' rights, particularly the rights contained in
Article 16 (themselves already limited by the need to show confusion
or deception). It also points clearly to the need to take account of the
legitimate interests of trademark owners. 161 As discussed below, if all
that was meant by legitimate interests was the express rights in
Article 16, then Article 17 would likely have said so. Instead it uses
the phrase legitimate interests.

Articles 19 and 20 then provide limits on government-imposed
use restrictions. Under Article 19.1, a ban on use cannot be used to
cancel a registration, signaling that the ban may well be
temporary.162 Indeed, that is precisely why a trademark owner would
want to maintain the registration. Then Article 20, which was
examined in Part IV.A and Part IV.B, limits certain encumbrances. It
lists three examples of such prima facie unjustified encumbrances by

158.
The reason that Article 16 rights can be labeled as providing for negative
rights is because they are expressed as "exclusive right[s] to prevent all third
parties. . . ." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 16.
159.
Id.
160.
See infra note 164.
161.
See infra Part IV.D.
162.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 19.1 ("Circumstances arising
independently of the will of the owner of the trademark which constitute an obstacle to
the use of trademark, such as import restrictions on or other government requirements
for goods or services protected by the trademark, shall be recognized as valid reasons
for non-use.").
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special requirement. 163 It is thus not unreasonable to examine
encumbrances with this as the contextual backdrop.
For now, this Article turns to the various rights in Article 16. It
will return to the legitimate interests and Article 17 in the next
subpart.
1.

"Rights Conferred," Article 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3

Article 16 as a whole is entitled "Rights Conferred." Article 16.1
sets out the minimum standards for actionable infringement of
registered trademarks that members of the TRIPS Agreement must
include in their domestic laws.164 It is worth remembering that the
plain packaging issue is not a third-party-trademark-infringement
issue of the kind set out in Article 16. While it is not directly
applicable to the issue of what amounts to unjustifiably encumbered,
Article 16 is relevant context, however, for the interpretation of
Article 20.
From a country's standpoint, Article 16, or indeed any part of the
TRIPS Agreement, is not a complete code;' 65 it is a set of minimum
standards that must be enacted in domestic law.1 66 Therefore, when
domestic regimes implement these minimum standards, they add to
the exact words of the TRIPS Agreement in order to make the law
function.1 67 This does not change the nature of the international

163.
164.

Id. at art. 20.
Article 16.1 reads:

The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent
all third parties not having the owner's consent from using in the course of
trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or
similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use
would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign
for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. The
rights described above shall not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall
they affect the possibility of Members making rights available on the basis of
use.
Id. at art. 16.1.
165.
But as discussed above, this does not mean that the object and purpose of
the treaty cannot be gleaned from trademark policy and the shared understanding of
members of the treaty.
166.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 1.1 (clarifying that the TRIPS
Agreement does not create law for member nations).
167.
This is exactly why domestic laws give property rights to use a trademark
and how that use is governed. See, e.g., Trademarks Act 1995 (Cth) s 20 (AustI.)
(providing that owners of registered trademarks have the exclusive right to use their
trademarks and to authorize other persons to use them). Each trademark was personal
property and each trademark owner could deal with its mark as the absolute owner. Id.
at ss 21(1), 22. Equities in relation to each trademark could "be enforced against the
registered owner, except to the prejudice of a purchaser in good faith for value." Id. at
s 22(3). Each trademark owner could authorize others to use its mark. Id. at s 26.
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obligation as a minimum standard, but it indicates that a purely
literal reading of the provision may not give the full picture. In part,
that is why context and object and purpose are also part of the VCLT
method of interpretation. 168
The essence of the negative-rights argument is that because
trademark owners' Article 16 exclusive rights are rights to exclude,
there is no right to use the trademark. 169 Therefore, part of this
argument is that Article 17 is not directly relevant to plain
packaging.170 As discussed previously, whether or not both Articles
16 and 17 are directly applicable, they are part of the context, which
is critical to a correct VCLT interpretation of Article 20. The
proponents of the negative-rights argument do not give full, if any,
weight to these aspects of context, and, consequently, when
discussing Article 20, they seem to effectively dismiss any role for
legitimate interests of trademark owners.
This beguilingly simple interpretation of trademark rights being
wholly negative in nature appears to ignore a wealth of literature and
theory about the nature of property, the meaning of ownership, the
meaning of rights to exclude, and even the specific notion of negative

168.
VCLT, supra note 5, at art. 31.
Presentation, Society of
169.
Henning Gross Ruse-Khan, Conference
International Economic Law Conference 2012, Singapore (July 12-14, 2012); see
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Assessing the Need for a General Public Interest Exception
in the TRIPS Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE
SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF TRIPS 167, 197 (Annette Kur ed., 2011) (providing
the negative-rights argument that IP protection "does not grant a positive monopoly or
guarantee to exploit the protected subject matter"); Voon & Mitchell, Face Off, supra
note 94, at 233-36 ("(T]rademark rights are negative rights. . . ."); Voon & Mitchell,
Implications of WTO Law for Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products, supra note 94, at
115-19' (arguing that the limitations of Articles 16 and 17 are a grant of negative
rights); Simon Evans & Jason Bosland, Plain Packaging of Cigarettes and
Constitutional Property Rights, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF
CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES 51-52 (Tania Voon et al. eds., 2012) (acknowledging the
positive nature of Article 20).
170.
See Mitchell, supra note 46, at 417. As Mitchell says:
TRIPS Article 17 reads that 'Members may provide limited exceptions to the
rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided
that such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the
trademark and of third parties.' . . . However, the Article 17 exception is not
even engaged when read in the context of Article 16. Article 17, titled
'Exceptions', refers to 'exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark'.
Article 16 governs the rights to be conferred by a trademark. As stated above,
these rights do not grant a positive right to use a trademark, only a negative
right to stop others from using it. Accordingly, plain packaging of tobacco
products cannot fall within the scope of Article 17 as an exception to a right to
use a trademark since no such right is conferred with a trademark.
Although, as discussed TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, Mitchell acknowledges a
positive obligation of some kind.
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rights.1 7' There is a leap in logic from saying that because Article 16
frames certain rights as exclusive rights against infringement
(negative rights), therefore trademark owners have no rights to use
(positive rights). For one thing, as noted above, they have a right to
apply to register (subject to meeting requirements). This (positive)
right is there for a reason, which the context easily explains:
trademark owners register a mark to use it and maintain orderly use
in commerce.
Commentary about rights to exclude and what they entail arise
in different legal contexts, including constitutional law,1 72 property
law, and contract law 173 to name a few. Most relevant here is
property law.174 It is the essence of a trademark right that it should

171.
See generally supra note 1 (citing language in the TRIPS Agreement that
implies a negative right). There is a considerable literature about the nature of
property and how it is defined. A key theme is how to define ownership. One school of
thought is that ownership is a bundle of rights. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-27 (1977) ("The real question for the lawScientifically understood-is not to identify 'the' rights of 'the' property owner through
some mysterious intuitive process but to determine in whose bundle one or another
right may best be put."); see also James E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of
Property, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711, 712 (1996). Another approach is that the ability to
exclude is the touchstone of property. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 145, at 145 (asserting
the importance of exclusion to the concept of property). Advocates of the exclusion
school seem to reject the bundle of rights explanation. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics, 111 YALE L.J.
357, 357-58 (2001) (analyzing the either-or arguments of legal scholars concerning the
two conceptions of property rights). An alternative view is not to define property by the
ability to exclude but by the rules of governance of ownership. See Henry E. Smith,
Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S453-57 (2002). Others argue that the ability to exclude does not define
the ambit of the property owners' rights. It explains third parties' exclusion but not the
meaning of ownership. See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58
U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 277-79 (2008) (asserting that exclusivity is a part of ownership
but is not the entirety of ownership rights).
172.
In the constitutional context, this is usually about states' duties to facilitate
rights. See, e.g., David P Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 864, 864-65 (1986) (explaining the constraints of the government's
affirmative duties under the constitution); Michael Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of
Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 409, 414 (1990) ("The debate over the significance of the distinction between
positive and negative rights is part of the even larger debate on the proper relationship
between the federal and state governments with respect to each other and to individual
liberties.").
See, e.g., Elisabeth Peden, IncorporatingTerms of Good Faith in Contract
173.
Law in Australia, 23 SYDNEY L. REV. 222, 227 (2001) (describing a contract dispute
that implicated the rights of a property owner and a tenant).
174.
The.1ine between the positive and the negative is not bright, rather the
ambit of the positive and the negative overlap. Perhaps more fundamentally, however,
the leading property theorists do not discuss property in these terms. The right to
exclude or exclusion rights is the usual terminology.
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be used in trade. 175 Use in commerce is the normative underpinning
of the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement.1 76 The TRIPS
Agreement provides (as does the Paris Convention with respect to
well-known marks in Article 6bis) a right to exclude, the purpose of
which is to reserve that space for use by the trademark owner or by
others with the trademark owner's consent.177 That is the essence of
trademark law and of the right to exclude in property law more
generally.' 7 8
The key question is-Does the right to exclude give the owner of
the exclusion a right to anything else? Using Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld's terminology, from exclusion arise "privileges." 179 The
property right should be seen as a combination of both exclusion and
privilege if one is to understand the veritable purpose of property
rights.

175.
See Ferguson, supra note 112, at 224 (explaining that a trademark is "a
common law right acquired through use in commerce").
176.
Id.
177.
See DANIEL GERVAIS, JAPAN TOBACCO INT'L, ANALYSIS OF THE
COMPATIBILITY OF CERTAIN TOBACCO PRODUCT PACKAGING RULES WITH THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND THE PARIS CONVENTION 9 (Nov. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.smoke-free.ca/trade-and-tobacco[Resources/Gervais.pdf
(arguing
that
trademarks create negative rights and not positive rights). That report was criticized.
For a response to some of the comments, see Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and
TRIPS: A Response to Professors Davison, Mitchell and Voon, 23 AUSTR. INTELL. PROP.
J. 96-110 (2013).
178.
The situation may be different for copyright and patents. This Article does
not conduct a full analysis of that point here but notes the following. As previously
discussed, much property is delineated by rights to exclude. This includes patents.
Indeed, international discussions on an obligation to work a patent failed to reach
consensus and many patents are issued and used to block competitors (blocking
patents). See Gail E. Evans, Review of Peter Drahos' The Global Governance of
Knowledge: Patent Offices and Their Clients, 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 63, 63 (2011)
(book review).
Copyright protects unpublished works, and authors have no obligation to make
works available. It would still be a useful right if a copy of the work was published
(because it was shared with a friend, stolen, etc.). In both cases, a pure right to exclude
makes sense in context. For example, the Berne Convention has specific rules
concerning unpublished works. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works art. 9(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 28,
1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
The point is that trademarks are different because it is use in commerce by others
likely to cause confusion that is targeted by the right(s), which in turn makes sense if
the mark is actually used by its owner.
179.
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 21 (1913). Others may use liberties
rather than privileges. See A. M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113 n.1 (A. G. Guest ed., 1961) (describing property rights as a
group of privileges). For discussion of liberty and private property, see generally
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 290 (1988) (highlighting the
connection between private property and liberty).
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Some property theorists advocate the "bundle of rights"
approach. Others say the bundle of rights does not explain enough. It
does not explain what can be done with those rights. It seems that
some commentators who say the trademark rights in the TRIPS
Agreement are limited to the exact words of Article 16 favor a limited
bundle of rights approach (i.e., any benefit the trademark owner has
from Article 20 is not in the bundle). This Article does not rest on the
premise that a proper survey of trademark law requires the
resolution of that grand property debate. Property law is used in this
Article to show that the negative-rights argument cited in the
literature is not the whole story. Property theory advocating a bundle
of rights approach does not explain much about trademark rights in
fact. It does not explain the legitimate interests that trademark
owners have in the use of their marks. To utilize property language,
the area of privilege that is found as a result of trademark owners'
exclusive rights is where trademark owners use their mark. They
have a legitimate interest in doing so.
In trademark law, one could also talk of privileges, not just
rights. This is relevant to the phrase legitimate interests, the
expression used in the TRIPS Agreement. 180 Under this Article's
continuum perspective, Hofheldian privileges in which the property
owner might claim legitimate interests are somewhere between the
two extreme (all or nothing) approaches outlined above. In the
authors' view, the TRIPS Agreement's acknowledgement of
trademark owners' legitimate interests is more than a prohibition of
third parties from using the marks. If Article 17's use of legitimate
interests was intended to mean only the phrase exclusive rights or an
equivalent, then Article 16 language would have been chosen over
legitimate interests. A legitimate interest can coexist with a right of
course, but it is a broader notion. That is, a right is a legitimate
interest, but not all legitimate interests are rights.
The real crux of the matter is how far do those interests go? Can
those interests be eroded (not by breaching the right to exclude) by
the state determining rules about the space in which the privilege
operates? 181 Here there are some useful parallel discussions in real

In this continuum, privileges and legitimate interests are somewhere in
180.
between the two extremes of the all or nothing approaches that are outlined above.
While exclusion purists might disagree, in the authors' view legitimate interests are
more positive than privileges. By stating that trademark owners have legitimate
interests, the TRIPS Agreement thus says more than that third parties cannot
interfere with use by the owner. A legitimate interest can coexist with a right-that is,
a right is a legitimate interest, but not all legitimate interests are rights.
181.
States have the power to regulate, but they also sometimes agree to limit
national autonomy through international agreements. This leads to constitutional
concerns about when the state must compensate for such regulatory takings. See
discussion infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the Australian constitutional dispute).
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property law. Of course real property and intellectual property are
not the same, but the notion of exclusive rights and their boundaries
pervade all areas of property law. 182 Where it is used, the terminology
of positive and negative rights is useful as a definitional tool rather
than lending any explanation about the substance of the right.18 3 The
UK Law Commission in its review of easements, for example,
concluded that whether an easement 184 is positive or negative
depends on substance, not form.18 5
The main reason that rights to exclude are necessary is so that
those who use or want to use property are able to determine who "has
what"186 and whose consent is needed to use the property in any
particular circumstance. 187 Alternatives to exclusion rights
terminology in this context are positive rights, "specific use rights," or

Intellectual property may have adopted the negative-rights terminology
182.
from real property. Many property lawyers, however, do not use the terminology of
negative rights. Rather, they use the terminology of rights to exclude.
183.
See JTInt'1 SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 37 (Austl.) ("Plainly, not
all property rights are defined only by rights of exclusion. In law the term 'property'
generally refers to 'a legal relationship with a thing' and in many cases is helpfully
described as 'a bundle of rights."').
184.
The U.K. L. COMM'N, EASEMENTS, COVENANTS AND PROFITS A PRENDRE: A
1.8 (Consultation Paper No. 186, 2008) defines an
CONSULTATION ANALYSIS
easement as
a right enjoyed by one landowner over the land of another, both plots usually
being in close proximity. A positive easement allows a landowner to go onto or
make use of some installation on his or her neighbour's land. This could be a
right of way providing access (vehicular or pedestrian). It could be a right to
install and use a pipe or a drain. A negative easement is essentially a right to
receive something from land owned by another without obstruction or
interference. The law recognizes as negative easements the right of support of
buildings from land (or from buildings), the right to receive light through a
defined aperture, the right to receive air through a defined channel and the
right to receive a flow of water in an artificial stream.
185.
See id. 7.20 ("The question whether a particular obligation is positive or
restrictive [in terms of covenants] is one of substance rather than form. For example, a
covenant not to allow trees to grow above a certain height, although worded in a
negative way, is nevertheless a positive covenant because it requires the covenantor to
take positive action to comply."). One might justifiably ask what relevance easements
have to trademarks. The answer is not very much at all, but the importance is the
illustration of the interplay of negative- and positive-rights terminology. Id. T 15.1. In
the easement context, there can be a positive right to make use of a neighbor's land.
Examples include to walk or drive across it or to install and use a drain. A negative
easement is to receive something from a neighbor's land without that neighbor
obstructing or interfering with it, such as "a right of support of buildings from land (or
from buildings), a right to receive light through a defined aperture, a right to receive
air through a defined channel and a right to receive a flow of water in an artificial
stream." Id.
Rose, supra note 145, at 131.
186.
187.
Moses, supra note 144.
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a governance strategy. 188 Specific use rights certainly exist in
property law, but they are often not the definitional framework
because either they are too absolute or they leave too many gaps.' 89 If
a property owner's rights are not defined as rights to exclude others
from the property, laws affecting the property might be harder to
make without expressly calling them exceptions to owners' rights. If
the rights of property owners were defined in a positive list, then gaps
would potentially arise or there would be costs of governance,
whereas the right to exclude others from property avoids these sorts
of problems.19 0 In an exclusion approach to property, the owner acts
as a gatekeeper and may have the privilege to use the property
without the exact details of the privilege necessarily being defined.19 1
The law does not give unrestricted control to any property owner, but
just because rights to exclude define the property that does not mean
there is not a right to use. 192 There certainly seems to be a legitimate
interest in using one's property.
Terminological fog may be masking what is at bottom a fairly
clear point. That point is that because the main parameters of
trademark ownership are framed as rights to exclude does not mean
that there are no legitimate interests relating to the property in
question. Put differently, the label negative rights neither fully
encapsulates nor determines the full scope of the "right" or the
"contours of an owner's position." 193 Rather, the right's scope is
determined by what the right in fact is.

188.
Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: DelineatingEntitlements
in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1747 (2007).
189.
The ability for the state to "take" property varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, and whether such actions are so-called takings is of course a complex
question with answers that vary between jurisdictions. But if property is absolute, all
regulations would be an incursion on property rather than the recognized lawmaking
power of government.
See Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 171, at S468-69
190.
(examining the relative costs between governance and exclusion schemes). House
ownership is illustrative. One says a person owns a house, but the legal rights are
defined by rights of exclusion (negative rights). The right to exclude others from
property may in effect give the positive right to occupy (possess) that property. There
will be jurisdictional differences about how property rights are detailed. Even given
such jurisdictional differences, in many and particularly common law jurisdictions,
owning a house means that the owner has a negative right to exclude others from the
house in question and a positive right to occupy the same house, but that right to
occupy is not absolute. One of the reasons for this is to enable laws about what can be
done on a property in, for example, a residential area.
191.
See id. (noting that an owner is not limited in use through an exclusion
measurement regime).
192.
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 171, at 361 (recognizing that "[mlodern
commentators have justifiably criticized the suggestion . .. that property rights are
absolute"); see also THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY (2010).
193.
Katz, supranote 171, at 285.
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The better analysis, therefore, is what the functions of the rights
are and what interests flow from those rights. Such an approach
recognizes that the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement must be
via the ordinary meaning of the terms, but not the ordinary meaning
alone; the meaning in light of context and object and purpose of the
agreement. 194 This is the "holistic" approach mandated by the
VCLT.195
A trademark owner has the right to exclude others from use of
the trademark and a right to register the mark.19 6 A trademark
owner, therefore, has in principle the ability and interest (but not
necessarily the right) to use the trademark in circumstances where
others do not. In fact, if the trademark owner does not use the
trademark, the TRIPS Agreement provides that members' laws can
have rules for removal from the register for non-use. 197 Then, if a
trademark owner does use a trademark, the rights increase in
strength. 9 8
Use of a trademark is relevant for another reason: it directly
affects the scope of the rights therein. Under Articles 16.2 and 16.3,
and also in the earlier text of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, the
more a trademark is known, which can only happen through some
form of use, the larger is its ambit of protection. 9 9 Those provisions
reflect a well-accepted principle in trademark law. The Court of
Justice of the European Union explained the rationale for this in

L'Ordal v. Bellure:
[T]he stronger that mark's distinctive character and reputation are, the
easier it will be to accept that detriment has been caused to it. It is also
clear from the case-law that, the more immediately and strongly the
mark is brought to mind by the sign, the greater the likelihood that the
current or future use of the sign is taking, or will take, unfair
advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the mark or is, or
20 0
will be, detrimental to them.

194.
As discussed supra, these are the requirements of Article 31 of the VCTL.
VCLT, supra note 5, at art. 31.
195.
Id.
196.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 16.
197.
See id. at art. 19 ("If use is required to maintain a registration, the
registration may be cancelled only after an uninterrupted period of at least three years
of non-use.").
198.
See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
199.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at arts. 16.2-16.3 ("In determining
whether a trademark is well-known, Members shall take account of the knowledge of
the trademark in the relevant sector of the public. . . ." (citing Paris Convention, supra
note 86, at art. 6bis)).
200.
Case C-487/07, L'Ordal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. 1-5185, 1 44 (citing
Case C-252/07, Intel Corp. v. CPM United Kingdom Ltd., 2008 E.C.R. 1-8823, TT 6769); see also European Communities Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 129,
1 7.664.
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Intuitively, if a well-known mark ceases to be used
(remembering that it became famous not because it was registered
but rather because it was used extensively), then it seems fair to
surmise that it may lose its well-known status and rights under
Article 16.3. A total or partial encumbrance under Article 20 should
thus be informed by Article 20's immediate context (here, Section 2 of
Part II of the TRIPS Agreement). The mark that is encumbered has a
scope of protection that depends on its use and that is arguably at
least equal to the scope that is protected under Article 20. In other
words, Article 20 protects a trademark from certain encumbrances as
that mark is. An argument could thus be made that unless required
to achieve its public health objective, a trademark-restrictive measure
should allow the mark to continue to be used to maintain its wellknown status, something that the proposed EU directive may do (for
certain trademarks at least), 20 1 but not the Australian statute. 202
WTO members implementing plain packaging measures (as
recommended in the Guidelines) should consider obligations under
the TRIPS Agreement and other legal instruments. The EU example
shows that different policy approaches and outcomes are possible. 203
Therefore, the registration of a trademark arguably reflects a
legitimate interest of the trademark owner to use the trademark in
accordance with the TRIPS Agreement. It also gives rise to the
possibility that the trademark has other features associated with
property. For example, the trademark can be alienated.
In determining the contours of the legitimate interest in using a
mark as context to understand the trademark section of the TRIPS
Agreement, one could, and perhaps should, distinguish a right to use
existing property from the right to use a totally new mark and the
effect non-use may have on the mark's value in each case. Articles
16.2 and 16.3 recognize that certain marks have high(er) value and
aimed to protect such value. Those marks are typically well-known
because they have been in use for years and the subject of massive
promotional investments. An Article 20 interpretation consistent with
this reveals not a full right to use per se but the assumption that a
mark would be in use (otherwise why protect use against
encumbrances?). Again, this is not a right to use writ large because
that would entail a right for a person to begin using a new mark.
However, a serious encroachment on an existing mark (that is, one
that is in use), especially a well-known one, might, as the property

201.
Presentationand Sale of Tobacco and Related Products, supra note 59, at 7.
Of course, this would also depend on actual implementation because the proposed text
does not guarantee a minimum space for the mark(s) to be displayed. The draft
directive bans the use of marks deemed misleading but may ban the use of certain
other marks.
202.
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
203.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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analysis above demonstrates, be considered separately from the use
of a new mark. To that extent, a limited or qualified positive right in
that mark may be said to exist in the TRIPS Agreement. 204
2.

The Constitutional Property Case in Australia

The negative-rights arguments received some discussion in the
decision of the High Court of Australia (the High Court) as to
whether the Australian plain packaging legislation amounted to a
constitutional violation. 205 The constitutional arguments are not
relevant to TRIPS Agreement interpretation, but the approach in
that case to the negative-rights argument generally may be of some
relevance. The central issue of that case was whether there had been
an acquisition of property that, under the constitution, needed to be
compensated on just terms (a regulatory expropriation). 206 The
negative-rights argument in that context, and more generally in
domestic law, is a way of arguing that no property has been taken or
acquired. That is not the TRIPS Agreement violation argument.
Therefore, this Article will not discuss the details of Australian, or
other jurisdictions', regulatory expropriation laws. However, the
negative-rights argument is not an answer to whether trademark
owners' legitimate interests under domestic law have been affected.
An argument that there is no legitimate interest in trademark use (or
other rights, such as assignment) because infringement rights are
rights to exclude is not sustainable given the whole picture under
domestic law, particularly when trademarks are termed property

204.
As Advocate-General of the of Court of Justice of the European Union
explained in Case C-561/11, Federation Cynologique Internationale v. Federaci6n
Canina International de Perros de Pura Raza, 2013 E.T.M.R. 23, 38, n.23 (CJEU AG
Mengozzi):
-

Legal writers have, however, pointed out that this 'exclusive right' embraces
not only the negative right set out in the provision-the jus excludendiconsisting in the right to prohibit third parties from using a sign that is similar
or identical, but also the positive right, that is to say the right actually to use
that sign, namely, the jus utendi, which may also be exercised by licensing use
of the trade mark.

205.
The argument was that the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 would affect
an acquisition of property on "other than just terms" contrary to the guarantee
provided by s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution. JT Int'l SA v Commonwealth
[2012] HCA 43
2 (Austl.). Interestingly, in JT Int'l SA v Commonwealth, Justice
Gummow found there had been an impairment ( 138) amounting to a "taking" ( 141)
but not an acquisition and therefore not a constitutional violation ($$ 144-54). But see
JT Int'l SA [2012] HCA 43 11 210-12 (Heydon, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plan
effected an unconstitutional taking of property).
206.
This is an argument that finds its legal basis in the Australian
Constitution. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxxi) (providing that the acquisition of
property must be "on just terms").
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rights. The point is that trademark interests are affected even if there
is no property rights remedy.20 7
Although in the High Court decision no constitutional violation
was found, several of the High Court judges agreed that the
trademark interests had been affected. 208 Indeed, this seems hard to
dispute. It is the means to the legislation's end. The dispute then
turned to whether property rights remedies were available. Justice
Gummow held that the trademark property had been "impaired" and,
thus, that there was a "taking," but the government did not acquire
the trademarks because title was not taken. 20 9 Justice Heydon, in
dissent, held that there had been an acquisition. 2 10 Justice Keifel
found that there had been no acquisition. 211 She noted that aspects of
trademark rights are negative and said:
... It may be accepted that some or much of the value of their
intellectual property has been lost in Australia. A trademark that
cannot be lawfully used in connection with the goods to which it is
relevant is unlikely to be readily assignable. The restriction on the use
of the marks is likely to have effects upon the custom drawn to their
212
businesses and upon their profits.

3.

Conclusions on the Nature of Trademark Rights

Just as the "all trademark rights are negative-rights" argument
discussed in the previous subparts does not answer whether
trademark rights and interests are affected at domestic law, it also
does not answer whether the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement
have been violated.
To use the debate over the right to exclude and corresponding
absence of an explicit right to use in the TRIPS Agreement as a full
answer to whether or not plain packaging may be a TRIPS
Agreement violation is thus a faulty interpretive method. Why that
matters is that such a method is potentially problematic outside of
the plain packaging context. For example, if trademark rights are
only exclusionary rights to prevent infringement, as expressed in
Article 16, What is to stop countries from declaring politically
inconvenient trademarks unable to be used? Freedom of expression
provides a good illustration of the nature of trademark rights. In
many jurisdictions, trademark law does not allow owners to prevent
207.
Although, there may be a claim under a BIT where the BIT provides for
something less than expropriation, such as compensation for impairment, or provides
for both. That, however, is a different discussion beyond the scope of this Article.
208.
See JT Int'1 SA, [2012] HCA 43 11 44, 138, 210 (Gummow, J.) (suggesting
that the law impairs if not eliminates some rights to trademark properties).
209.
Id. $ 138, 141.
210.
JTInt7 SA, [2012] HCA 43
210-12 (Heydon, J., dissenting).
211.
JTIntl SA, [2012] HCA 43 1 308 (Kiefel, J., concurring).
212.
Id. 1 356.
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the use of trademarks in two broad ways: as descriptors (including
making comparisons) of goods or services and where used to comment
about goods or services (nominative use). 213 Article 17 of the TRIPS
Agreement contemplates such exclusions from the rights of
trademark owners. 214
Although the line between trademark owners' rights and
freedom of expression is sometimes unclear and varies between
jurisdictions with different notions of freedom of expression, the
broad rule is that commercial use of trademarks is infringing,
whereas, free expression uses are not. 215 Indeed, arguments over the
use of trademarks and the scope of dilution as an infringement arise
precisely because trademark owners' rights are not absolute but have
boundaries. 216
Put differently, all members of the TRIPS Agreement have a fair
degree of regulatory autonomy over trademarks and how to
implement their trademark laws, 217 but that does not mean that the
TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted so that trademark rights
cease to have meaning because of the regulatory goals of the
members. Rather, those regulatory goals must not be unjustified if
Article 20 is to be given any real meaning.
This Article concludes that the negative-rights argument alone
does not lead to an accurate interpretation of the scope of trademark
owners' rights and legitimate interests under the TRIPS Agreement.
The negative-rights approach does not give proper weight to the
context and object and purpose aspects of the TRIPS Agreement as
VCLT interpretation requires. The argument that Article 16 of the
TRIPS Agreement sets out exclusionary rights against infringement
and, therefore, prevents any notion of the trademark owner from
having a legitimate interest to use a trademark is not sound. The fact
that the boundary between negative rights and positive rights is ill
defined does not mean that there must be an absolute positive right.
Rather, the context of negative rights does not preclude there being
some positive rights and interests to register and use a trademark.

213.
See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445
F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that
comparative advertising is supported by free speech).
214.
Article 17 provides: "Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights
conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such
exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of
third parties." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17.
215.
Another approach is to find infringement but grant no remedy because of
the free speech interest. See PC Direct v Best Buys [1997] 2 NZLR 723 (HC).
216.
For a discussion of how far trademark owners' rights extend in regard to
dilution see, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Dilution's (Still) Uncertain
Future, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 98 (2006), available at
http://students.aw.umich.edulmlr/firstimpressions/vol105/dinwoodie.pdf.
217.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at arts. 7-8.
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The existence of positive rights interests does not mean that there is
an absolute right to use and register. There is a nuanced middle
ground, which this Article has already indicated might be best
described as the legitimate interests of trademark owners, and it is to
defining this middle ground more precisely that this Article now
turns the analytical spotlight.

D. Legitimate Interests of Trademark Owners
Context that is relevant to the interpretation of Article 20
includes Article 17. Article 17 contains a version of the three-step test
for exceptions to the rights conferred to trademark owners, not just
those in Article 16. 218 Article 17 arguably does not have direct
application to the plain packaging issue in as far as it applies to
exceptions for third parties because the plain packaging issue is not a
third-party infringement issue. Article 17 will, however, govern the
scope of domestic law exceptions made to trademark owners'
legitimate interests, but that is not this Article's focus; as explained,
the focus is an analysis of Article 20. Article 17 is relevant, however,
as context for interpretation of Article 20. It includes express mention
of the legitimate interests of trademark owners. 219 The question
therefore is-What are those interests?
Article 17 was discussed at length by the panel in European

Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs. 220 The panel
pointed out the similarities and differences between Article 17 and
other instantiations of the three-step test under Articles 13, 26.2, and
30 of the TRIPS Agreement, as well as Article 9(2) of the Berne
Convention (1971) as incorporated by Article 9.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement. 221 Unlike these other provisions, Article 17 contains no
reference to "conflict with a normal exploitation," no reference to
"unreasonable prejudice" to the legitimate interests of the right
holder or owner, and it not only refers to the legitimate interests of
third parties but also treats them on par with those of the right

218.
Article 17 reads, "Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights
conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such
exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of
third parties." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17. This would apply, for
example, to the Paris Convention. In the Section 110(5) Panel Report supra note 105,
the panel similarly applied TRIPS Article 13 to rights contained in the Berne
Convention, not in the TRIPS Agreement. See supra note 105.
219.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17.
220.
European Communities Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 129, at 14150.
221.
Id. 7.649.
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holder. 222 It is also the only one of these provisions that contains an
example (namely, fair use of descriptive terms).
The panel concluded that the EU exception was limited within
the meaning of this article but cautioned that "[i]f the [geographical
indications (GI)] registration prevented the trademark owner from
exercising its rights against these signs, combinations of signs, or
linguistic versions, which do not appear expressly in the GI
registration, it would seriously expand the exception and undermine
the limitations on its scope."223 It found that the legitimate interests
of the trademark owner must be something different than full
enjoyment of legal rights and that the legitimate interests of third
parties were something different from simply the enjoyment of their
legal rights. 224 The panel found that
every trademark owner has a legitimate interest in preserving the
distinctiveness, or capacity to distinguish, of its trademark so that it
can perform that function. This includes its interest in using its own
trademark in connection with the relevant goods and services of its own
and authorized undertakings. Taking account of that legitimate
interest will also take account of the trademark owner's interest in the
economic value of its mark arising from the reputation that it enjoys
2 25
and the quality that it denotes.

The panel concluded that the EU regulation did "take account" of
those legitimate interests, adding that "the proviso to Article 17
requires only that exceptions 'take account' of the legitimate interests
of the owner of the trademark, and does not refer to 'unreasonabl[e]
prejudice' to those interests," which "suggests that a lesser standard
of regard for the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark is
required." 226 The legitimate interest in "preserving the
distinctiveness, or capacity to distinguish, of its trademark" also
seems consonant with Articles 16.2 and 16.3 and a trademark owner's
ability to maintain well-known status for a mark, which the
Australian legislation may make difficult if the mark cannot be used
at all.227
This view is further reinforced by the report in Canada
Pharmaceuticals.228 The WTO panel found that legitimate interests
relating to Article 30 included more than just the de jure interest
included in the patent exclusive rights part of the TRIPS

222.
Id.
Id. 7.657.
223.
Id. 7.662.
224.
225.
Id. 7.664.
226.
Id. 7.671.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 16.
227.
228.
Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
Complaint by the European Communities and Their Member States, WT/DS114/R (Mar.
17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada Pharmaceuticals Panel Report], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispuie/7428d.pdf.
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Agreement. 229 In that dispute, the question was whether the de facto
extension of a patent term, which arose from potential competitors
being unable to launch their product on the market the day that the
patent expired, was a legitimate interest of the patentee. 230 The panel
held that legitimate interests did not only mean legal interests (as
the European Communities had submitted) but also that it was
something different. 231 The panel noted that the third step of Article
30 required consideration of the legitimate interests of third parties
as well as the patent owner and confining the meaning of legitimate
interests to legal rights would make the reference to legitimate
interests of third parties redundant, as third parties had no patent
legal rights. 232 The panel said:
[Rleading the third condition as a further protection of legal rights
would render it essentially redundant in light of the very similar
protection of legal rights in the first condition of Article 30 ("limited
233
exception").

The same analysis applies to Article 17. The panel concluded:
To make sense of the term "legitimate interests" in this context, that
term must be- defined in the way that it is often used in legal discourse as a normative claim calling for protection of interests that are
"justifiable" in the sense that they are supported by relevant public
policies or other social norms. This is the sense of the word that often
appears in statements such as "X has no legitimate interest in being
234
able to do Y."

The dispute before the panel required it to analyze whether the
European Communities had a legitimate interest in the de facto
patent term (this was not an express right in the TRIPS
Agreement). 235 The panel found there was not such a legitimate
interest. 23 6 But the point is this: The panel looked for legitimate
interests beyond the exclusive rights expressed in the TRIPS
Agreement because it concluded that the wording of the TRIPS
Agreement recognized that such legitimate interests caft and do
exist.2 31
The question for trademark owners is-What legitimate
interests exist beyond the rights expressly set out in the TRIPS
Agreement? Such an approach, however, needs to be analyzed

229.
"exclusive
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.; see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 28 - (discussing the
rights" conferred by the TRIPS Agreement).
Canada Pharmaceuticals Panel Report, supranote 229, TT 2.1-2.7.
Id. 1 7.68.
Id.
Id.
Id. T 7.69.
Id.
Id.
Id.
7.74-7.83.
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carefully so as not to read in what does not exist in the TRIPS
Agreement but rather derives from VCLT interpretation of the
context in light of the treaty's object and purpose.
There is an important distinction to note between what this
Article discusses as the legitimate interests of trademark owners and
the notion of legitimate expectations. The former is relevant; the
latter is not a part of TRIPS Agreement interpretation. In India
Patents,238 the Appellate Body made it clear that TRIPS Agreement
interpretation should be undertaken using the VCLT method of
interpreting the ordinary meaning of the words of the agreement.23 9
There, the concern was that the GATT-developed concept of
legitimate expectations should not be read into TRIPS Agreement
disputes because of the connection between the jurisprudence on
legitimate expectations under GATT and nonviolation disputes. 240 As
nonviolation disputes are not available under the TRIPS
Agreement, 241 the Appellate Body held that the GATT jurisprudence
was not very relevant to the TRIPS Agreement interpretation in this
context, noting that the "TRIPS Agreement, the entire text of which
was newly negotiated in the Uruguay

Round[,] ... occupies

a

relatively self-contained, sui generis status in the WTO
Agreement." 242 Hence, it seems that legitimate expectations are
different from legitimate interests and that few useful bridges, if any,
can be built between the two notions.
It seems possible, therefore, that the legitimate interests arising
from registration, including the right to use a trademark and benefit
from rights arising from use, could be taken into account here. The
legitimate interests of the trademark owner must mean something
different from the exclusive rights of the owner in Article 16. The very
phrase itself supports this, as the above discussed WTO panels have
concluded. If they mean the same thing, then Article 16 might be
expected to have used the phrase legitimate interest rather than
exclusive rights.

238.
Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for 'Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter India
Pharmaceutical Panel Report].
239.
Id. 7.18.
240.
See Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, Good Faith and the
Protection of Legitimate Expectations in the WTO, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 60 (Marco
Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000) (mentioning that the Appellate Body has
rejected the use of legitimate expectations other than in nonviolation cases).
241.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 64.2.
242.
India Pharmaceutical Panel Report, supra note 239, 1 7.19. On the unique
status of the TRIPS Agreement, see Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 413,
415 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997).
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Finally, and crucially, the very existence of the phrase legitimate
interests in Article 17 supports the argument about negative rights
above. If the use of the exclusive rights formula means that rights are
only negative in substance, then the trademark owner cannot have a
legitimate interest. Yet, that cannot be so for all the reasons
discussed, and the TRIPS Agreement explicitly acknowledges this in
choosing the notion of legitimate interests in Article 17.
V. THE ROLE AND MEANING OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

The VCLT suggests that Article 8 must be read in the context of
the entire agreement, including the preamble (particularly the fifth
and sixth paragraphs). 243 Article 8 is also important and useful in
explaining the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. 244 This
provision allows WTO members to take action to protect public health
and to adopt measures against abuse of intellectual property
rights. 245 It is thus tempting, but wrong, to argue that this Article
allows broad (categorical) new exceptions to any of the rights
contained in the TRIPS Agreement. 246 However, both paragraphs of
Article 8 are limited by the use of the phrase "consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement." 247 The drafting history shows that
these were not accidental additions to the early drafts. 248 In fact,
several different text options were suggested, including a negative
limit that would have allowed measures that "do not derogate from
obligations" contained in the TRIPS Agreement, which seems

243.
The TRIPS Agreement preamble includes the following:
Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the
protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological
objectives; Recognizing also the special needs of the least-developed country Members
in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and
regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at 300.
244.
Indeed, the title of Article 8 is "Principles," which seems to imply an
overarching interpretive function. Id. at art. 8.
245.
Id.
246. See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, 745 (2d ed, 2008), (". . . the provision in Article 8 is limited by the
requirement that measures falling there under be consistent with the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement. Thus, rather than creating an exception from TRIPS disciplines for
measures serving public policy objectives, Article 8 is best seen as enunciating a
fundamental principle of the TRIPS Agreement to be taken into account, with Article 7,
when interpreting and applying its remaining provisions." (italics in original)).
247.
Article 8.2 would thus seem to apply to specific cases of abuse rather than
broad, categorical measures. Id.
248.
See GERVAIS, supra note 78, at 235-41 (discussing the drafting history of
the TRIPS Agreement).
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somewhat less restrictive than the positive obligation that any
measure be "consistent" with the agreement. 249
Given the clearly deliberate addition of the phrase "consistent
with the provisions of this [a]greement" during the negotiation, it
would be difficult to justify broad new exceptions not foreseen under
the TRIPS Agreement. 250 Indeed, in spite of the broad language,
WTO members negotiated for approximately 2 years to adopt the socalled paragraph 6 system, which allows exports of pharmaceuticals
produced under a compulsory license to the least-developed
members. 251 If Article 8 were a legal basis to adopt broad new
exceptions, Would not state practice and subsequent behavior tend to
support that view? 252 Here, it seems to do precisely the opposite.
Article 8 is perhaps best viewed as a policy statement with active
force; that is part of the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement.
For one thing, it provides a clear rationale for exceptions allowed
under the TRIPS Agreement (e.g., Articles 30, 31, and 40). It may,
and should-like the preamble and Article 7-serve an interpretive
function. Article 8 might assist in justifying specific measures, such
as neutralizing one or more specific patents during a public health
emergency, which the TRIPS Agreement allows. 2 5 3 This is quite
different from, say, banning patents on pharmaceutical inventions or
an entire class thereof, which would amount to a prohibited
categorical exception. 254
This may also apply to trademarks. The TRIPS Agreement does
contain a provision on exceptions to trademark rights-namely,
Article 17.255 It would be odd, as a matter of interpretation, to read
Article 8 as allowing exceptions that clearly violate Article 17.

249.
It is a principle of international law that states may do all that is not
prohibited. For a more complete drafting history, see id.
250.
Id.
251.
See id. at 498-505 (discussing the negotiations surrounding the TRIPS
Agreement).
252.
As the then-Permanent Court of International Justice (now the
International Court of Justice) noted: "If there were any ambiguity, the Court might,
for the purpose of arriving at the true meaning, consider the action which has been
taken under the treaty." Competence of the I.L.O. with respect to Agricultural Labour,
Advisory Opinion, 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 2, at 39-41 (Aug. 12). The VCLT
incorporates part of this concept in Article 31.3(b), which provides, "There shall be
taken into account, together with the context . . . (b) any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation." VCLT, supranote 5, at 31.3(b).
253.
Lorand Bartels, Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of Human Rights, 36 J.
WORLD TRADE 353, 354-55 (2002).
254.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 27.2; GERVAIS, supra note 78, at
428-33.
255.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 17.
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Otherwise, why would members have adopted Article 17 in the first
place?
In saying that Article 8 is perhaps best viewed as a policy
statement with active force, this Article does not mean to strip it of
meaning; quite the opposite is true. It is also noteworthy that Article
8 was underscored in the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration. 256 It (a)
confirms public health is a valid area to adopt an exception; 257 and (b)
signals that this area is of particular importance to WTO members. 258
Two categories of sources that are found outside of the TRIPS
Agreement are also relevant to using Article 8 in a VCLT
interpretation. These are other WTO agreements and other
international sources, such as the FCTC. 259
In Article 8's first function, it is beyond cavil that, as was shown
in several disputes, including the recent Clove Cigarettes,260 while a
WTO panel or the Appellate Body would be unlikely to challenge a
member's determination of its public interest or a sector of vital
importance, these bodies can consider the adequacy of the measure in
terms of the stated objective and its compatibility with WTO
obligations.2 6 1 It must be borne in mind that both paragraphs require
that the measure be necessary.262
This echoes the wording in the chapeau of GATT Article XX. In
Thai Cigarettes, the government of Thailand had imposed an import
ban on cigarettes on the grounds of public health considerations;
however, the panel concluded that there were less restrictive
alternatives than a ban. 263 The panel concluded that "the import
restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered to be 'necessary'
in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no alternative measure
256.
See Doha Declaration on Public Health, supra note 76.
257.
Id. TT 1, 4, 5(c).
Id.
258.
259.
VCLT Article 31.3(c) refers to "any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties" as something interpretation should
"take into account, together with the context." VCLT, supra note 5, at art. 31.3(c). This
Article does not rely on that rule to refer to other international sources, just as many
dispute settlement panels have not. This Article uses other sources as a method to
interpret open-textured terms that do not have a definition or meaning found in the
text of the TRIPS Agreement or other WTO agreements, but that have been discussed
elsewhere. See Frankel, supra note 10, at 401-02 (discussing the use of non-WTO
sources, including the FCTC) ; see also id. at 421-24.
260.
Appellate Body Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Production
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Clove
Cigarettes Appellate Body Report]; Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting
the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter
Clove Cigarettes Panel Report].
Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 260; Clove Cigarettes
261.
Panel Report, supra note 260.
262.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8.2 ("needed").
263.
Panel Report, Thailand-Restrictionson Importation of and Internal Taxes
on Cigarettes,DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1990).
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consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it,
which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its
health policy objectives." 264 The panel considered that Thailand could
reasonably be expected to implement strict, nondiscriminatory
labelling and ingredient disclosure regulations to address the qualityrelated policy objectives. 265
In Korea-Beef,266 the Appellate Body took a different approach. It
said "the term 'necessary' refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of
necessity. At one end of this continuum lies 'necessary' understood as
'indispensable'; at the other end, is 'necessary' taken to mean as
'making a contribution to.'" 267 The Appellate Body further said,
"[Dietermination of whether a measure, which is not 'indispensable',
may nevertheless be 'necessary' . . . involves in every case a process of

weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently include
the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement
of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common
interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the
accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or
exports." 268
In the above-mentioned interpretive function, Article 8 is used as
a guide for ongoing work by the Council for the TRIPS Agreement. 269
It has justified the work on and adoption of Article 31bis and the
extension of transitional periods available to the least-developed
countries. 270 It also allows the adoption of measures to promote what
a WTO member reasonably considers to be its public interest in vital
sectors, provided they are compatible with the TRIPS Agreement. 2 71
Previous panel reports support this approach. For example, in
European Communities-Protectionof Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 272 the panel
noted that Article 8 "inherently grants Members freedom to pursue
legitimate public policy objectives since many measures to attain
those public policy objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual

264.
Id. $ 75.
265.
Id.
266.
Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports Of Fresh,
Chilled And Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WTIDS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000); see also
infra note 279 and accompanying text.
267.
Id. 1161.
268.
Id. 1164.
269.
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 748 (2002), $ 19.
270.
TRIPS, supra note 1, at art. 66.1. The extension is valid until January 1,
2016.
271.
Id. at art. 8.
272.
European Communities Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 129;
Australia Panel Report, supra note 148.
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property rights and do not require an exception under the TRIPS
Agreement." 273
In regard to plain packaging, the key relevance of Article 8 is not
that it is an exception that allows public health measures that are
otherwise inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. The key function
of Article 8 is its relevance to interpreting the object and purpose of
the TRIPS Agreement and applying that to an interpretation of
Article 20. The public health objective in Article 8 is relevant to
interpreting what amounts to unjustifiably encumbered. 274 What is
meant by "public health" may require consideration of non-WTO
sources, and, in that context, a source outside the WTO that is
relevant to the meaning of public health is the FCTC and its
Guidelines. 275 Using such sources for interpretation, however, is
limited to the interpretationof the TRIPS Agreement. It should not
amount to a nonnegotiated amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. In
other words, if the goal is public health, an encumbrance may be
justified provided that the evidence supports it. Because the
establishment of panels had not yet happened as of this writing (last
revised in November 2013), several months after the entry into force
of the Australian statute, it may well be that actual evidence of the
impact of the measure will be available, in addition to theoretical
studies by experts that parties may adduce.
VI. BURDEN OF PROOF

It is uncontroversial as a matter of WTO law that the party
asserting a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is
responsible for providing proof for that fact. For example, in USWool Shirts and Blouses, the Appellate Body noted rather
convincingly that it was difficult "to see how any system of judicial
settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere
assertion of a claim might amount to proof." 276 The Appellate Body
added that it was
a generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in
fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party,
whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a
particular claim or defense. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to
raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts

European Communities Trademarks Panel Report, supra note 129, T 7.210;
273.
Australia Panel Report, supra notel48, 7.248.
274.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 8. This is where the evidence
referred to supra Part II.D will be relevant.
275.
See supra discussion Part II.D.
276.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, at 14, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997).
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to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to
2 77
rebut the presumption.

Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden of proof
then shifts to the other party. In other words, under WTO law, a
party alleging a violation must prove it. Once that has been done, a
party alleging a defense must prove it. There are thus two sequential,
binary propositions.
Deciding who has which burden should not detract from, or be
confused with, multifactor analyzes (e.g., under GATT Article XX(b))
where the choice of the measure, its impact on trade, and the nature
of the interest or value at stake are all taken into account.27 8 This has
at least two key consequences. First, the higher the nature of the
interest, the more likely a measure is to be considered necessary.
Here, Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement would support the view that
curbing youth smoking has high importance. It has also been the
practice of the WTO to require that a party asserting that a less
trade-restrictive measure could fulfill the objective should prove it.279
By the same token, however, the more trade restrictive a measure is
(as a complete ban on trademarks might fairly be considered to be),
the more evidence a party trying to justify the measure might be
expected to have, and the harder it might be to prove that the
alternative, less restrictive measures suggested by the complainant
are inadequate.
A further distinction must be made when considering other WTO
tests, such as under Article 2.2 of the TBT.28 0 That test combines the
two above analyzes by requiring that a complainant demonstrate to a

277.
Id. Citing its report in Wool Shirts and Blouses, the Appellate Body stated
in EC-Hormones: "When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to
the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency."
Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) 98, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
278.
See Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreaded Tyres,
156, WT/DS332/AB/R, (Dec. 3, 2007) ("In order to determine
whether a measure is 'necessary' within the meaning of Article XX(b) of the GATT
1994, a panel must assess all the relevant factors, particularly the extent of the
contribution to the achievement of a measure's objective and its trade restrictiveness,
in the light of the importance of the interests or values at stake.").
279.
For an example, see Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 260, T 7.331
in which the Appellate Body stated:
The parties also agree that Indonesia carries the burden of proof in respect of
its claim under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. On this point, the parties
agree that there is a significant difference between Article 2.2 and Article XX(b)
of the GATT 1994. . . . Thus, we proceed with our analysis on the
understanding that Indonesia must demonstrate that the ban on clove
cigarettes is more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate
objective . . ..

280.

TBT, supra note 19, at art. 2.2.
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panel's satisfaction that a measure is more restrictive than necessary
and that there are adequate alternative measures. 28 1 In the TBT
context, a panel might be said to take a proportional approach
factoring in the nature of the interest that justifies the measure and
the degree of restrictiveness. In addition, both under GATT XX and
TBT 2.2, the broad latitude of WTO members in making (valid) public
policy choices and decisions on how to implement them would be
directly relevant to their interpretation. 282
This might guide a dispute settlement panel in deciding how to
approach TRIPS Agreement Article 20 with its "contextual cousins,"
in particular Articles 16 and 17 and Article 8, which is critical to
VCLT interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement's object and purpose. A
major difference between the TRIPS Agreement and other WTO
instruments that a panel would likely consider is that the TRIPS
Agreement (unlike GATT or GATS) contains obligations concerning
specific rights of individual right holders28 3 and specific boundaries
on limitations and exceptions to such rights. 2 84
Against this backdrop, a party relying on Article 8 would
normally have the burden of proving its relevance. 285 But as this
Article discusses above, reliance on Article 8 directly to justify a new
exception is not the intended function of Article 8. If seen mostly as a
policy statement about object and purpose, however, Article 8 could
play a somewhat different role. It could be used to support (as a
normative matter) the justification for an exception adopted under
another provision of the TRIPS Agreement, or in the plain packaging
context, an evidence-based justification for an encumbrance under
Article 20.
In the recent Clove Cigarettes report, the Appellate Body noted
that "the burden of proof in respect of a particular provision of the
covered agreements cannot be understood in isolation from the

281.
See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products,
319-20,
WT/DS381/ABIR (June 13, 2012) (discussing the standard of necessity); Panel Report,
United States-MeasuresConcerningthe Importation,Marketing and Sale of Tuna and
Tuna Products, 7.458, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011) (same).
282.
See Sara Dillon, A Farewell To "Linkage"' International Trade Law and
Global SustainabilityIndicators, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 87, 97 (2002) (discussing public
policy decisions).
283.
The preamble states among its other goals, "Recognizing that intellectual
property rights are private rights." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at 300.
284.
Those boundaries are defined throughout the agreement where exceptions
and limitations must meet specific tests (arts. 13, 17, 30), specific criteria (arts. 27.2,
27.3, and 31), or both. Id. at arts. 13, 17, 27.2, 27.3, 30, 31.
285.
See Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 5.22,
DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D (39th Supp.) at 155, 197 (1991) (noting the
common practice of placing the burden on the party invoking Article XX); Panel Report,
United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 5.27, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989),
GATT B.I.S.D (36th Supp.) at 345, 393 (1989).
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overarching logic of that provision, and the function which it is
designed to serve." 286
That dispute is obviously relevant to this Article's argument. In
a matter involving tobacco and tobacco packaging, the Appellate Body
addressed the substance of the TBT Agreement and analyzed
whether the measure at issue was consistent with the United States'
trade obligations as a WTO member. The Appellate Body concluded
as follows:
We do not consider that the TBT Agreement or any of the covered
agreements is to be interpreted as preventing Members from devising
and implementing public health policies generally, and tobacco control
policies in particular, through the regulation of the content of tobacco
products, including the prohibition or restriction on the use of
ingredients that increase the attractiveness and palatability of
cigarettes for young and potential smokers. Moreover, we recognize the
importance of Members' efforts in the World Health Organization on
tobacco control.
While we have upheld the Panel's finding that the specific measure at
issue in this dispute is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT
Agreement, we are not saying that a Member cannot adopt measures to
pursue legitimate health objectives such as curbing and preventing
youth smoking. In particular, we are not saying that the United States
cannot ban clove cigarettes: however, if it chooses to do so, this has to
2 87
be done consistently with the TBT Agreement.

This is precisely the point of this Article. Article 8 is relevant in
justifying a measure that affects intellectual property rights, but (a)
consistency with the TRIPS Agreement must be established and (b)
the party asserting the justification has the burden of proof. That
said, one must carefully distinguish the party that has the burden of
proof from the standard to be applied to scientific evidence. The two
are linked in the sense that a party who has the burden of proof will
have to meet that burden in light of the standard applied. Yet, the
two remain analytically separate. To use the words of the panel
report in EC-Asbestos:
It is therefore for the European Communities to submit in respect of
this defence a prima facie case showing that the measure is
justified.... [I]n relation to the scientific information submitted by the
parties and the experts, . . . the Panel does not intend to set itself up as
an arbiter of the opinions expressed by the scientific community. Its
role, taking into account the burden of proof, is to determine whether
there is sufficient scientific evidence to conclude that there exists a risk
for human life or health and that the measures taken by France are
288
necessary in relation to the objectives pursued.

286.
See Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, supra note 260, 286.
287.
Id. T 235-36.
288.
Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 3,
8.177-8.182 (emphasis added).
Those statements were not reviewed by the Appellate Body.
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Similarly, in Clove Cigarettes the panel noted that the "evidence
before the Panel from health experts squarely contradicts Indonesia's
assertion that there is no scientific evidence to support the United
States ban on clove cigarettes" and referred to several scientific
articles and WHO studies.289
Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement prevents certain unjustified
encumbrances from being applied. In effect, the complaining party
has the burden to establish that there is an encumbrance by special
requirement. 290 As Article 20 refers to unjustified encumbrances, the
complaining party will argue that the encumbrance is unjustified.
The prime reason for alleging that a ban is an encumbrance is that it
prevents the trademark owner from use of its trademarks in
commerce.29 1 But the use of unjustified in Article 20 should not be
confused with the burden of proof. Clearly, the complainant is not the
party who relies on a domestic policy reason for the encumbrance.
Thus, the respondent carries the burden to show that the
encumbrance is justified. As such, Article 20 contains both an
obligation (not to impose prohibited measures) and the option of
providing a justification. This does not affect extant rules on the
burden of proof, according to which a party challenging a measure
should bear the prima facie burden of showing that the measure is
inconsistent with an obligation under the covered agreements. 292 If
that burden is met, taking account of the discussion of the applicable
standard of review of scientific evidence, then the party asserting a
justification or defense should bear the burden of proving that the
justification or defense applies. Indeed, this seems to be the logical
operation of Article 20, according to which use should not be
encumbered by special requirements unless such an encumbrance is
justified. Then a case can be made that a harsher encumbrance could
lead a panel to require a higher level of justification. 293
The panel-and perhaps the Appellate Body-may be called
upon to consider contradictory scientific evidence submitted by the
parties to the plain packaging cases. Independently of which party
has the burden of proof on each element of the dispute, a decision
may thus have to be made about the standard of review of such
evidence. As the authors of this Article see it, while there are many

289.
See Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, supra note 260, T 7.400-7.413, 7.415
(noting that "there is extensive scientific evidence supporting the conclusion that
banning clove and other flavored cigarettes could contribute to reducing youth
smoking").
290.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 20.
291.
See NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF TRADEMARKS AND
DESIGNS 431-38 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the implementation of Article 20).
292.
See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
293.
See Mitchell, supra note 46, at 418 ("It may be that the higher degree of
encumbrance, the higher the level of justification [is required].").
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ways to distinguish possible applicable standards, there are three
that come to mind. At what a panel might consider the lowest
standard, it would accept as justified a measure that has a rational
relationship to the measure. 294 At the highest level, it would ask for
near certainty that the measure will achieve its stated objectives,
which is difficult in any regulatory context due to inevitable
unintended consequences.2 95 Between those two extremes, one might
consider a test of substantial or firm evidence instead. A panel would
have to decide the strength and source of evidence and any contrary
evidence to decide which evidence, and to what degree, has been
contradicted. Bearing in mind, as in EC-Asbestos, who has the burden
of proving what in the case, an easier standard of a majority of the
available evidence might also be used. 296 That said, the authors of
this Article suggest that this and the substantial evidentiary
standard are likely to lead to similar outcomes. The purpose of the
analysis is not whether the measure is legitimate, as might be the
case in the context of the WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, but rather whether the
encroachment is justified.
Once a panel finds an encroachment on rights or legitimate
interests that the TRIPS Agreement protects-that is, the evidence is
considered in defense of such encroachment-a fair balancing of the
interests involved should be required. This Article suggests that a
simple rational relationship test without more is unlikely to achieve
this objective because by its nature the rational relationship test does
not balance interests that, as this Article has demonstrated, should
be done following a VCLT analysis.

VII. CONCLUSION

The issues around plain packaging and its impact on
international trademark law are complex. A key rule that a WTO
panel is very likely to consider is Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement,
which limits certain encumbrances (listing three examples of prima
facie unjustified encumbrances by special requirement). It allows a
member to justify an otherwise prohibited encumbrance. This Article
proposed a way of approaching Article 20 that places it in its TRIPS

294.
For a discussion of the tests applicable to assess scientific evidence at the
WTO and their purpose, see RONNIE R.F. YEARWOOD, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) LAW AND EXTERNAL LAW: THE CONSTRAINED
OPENNESS OF WTO LAW (A PROLOGUE TO A THEORY) 148-62 (2012).
295.
See Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate Technologies, 47 Hous. L.
REV. 665, 684-88 (2010) (discussing the "law" of unintended consequences in
regulatory theory).
296.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

1212

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:1149

Agreement context in light of the agreement's object and purpose. A
full analysis of context and object and purpose-as the VCLT
requires-provides a holistic approach to TRIPS Agreement
interpretation without modifying or adding to negotiated WTO texts.
This Article concludes the following about the relevant TRIPS
Agreement minimum standards:
* The debate over whether trademark owners have any right to
use their trademarks is wrongly depicted as binary (an either
or both choice). In fact, (a) trademark owners have a
legitimate interest in using their mark(s); and (b) the scope of
rights, including acquisition and maintenance of well-known
status, depends on actual use.
* The matter is thus best viewed as a continuum. At one end
would be an absolute right to use a mark in any context, an
approach that is unrealistic and that these authors squarely
reject. At the other end is a total ban on the use of a mark. At
that point, the right to exclude is mostly irrelevant because
even the legitimate owner of the mark cannot use his or her
own mark.
* Article 16 provides the rights that the trademark owner has
against third parties that use his or her mark without
authorization. Those rights are by no means absolute, for
example, when they are limited by the need to show consumer
confusion. The rights are greater when the mark has achieved
well-known status.
* The rights in Articles 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3 make sense in
context and in light of their object and purpose-that is, when
seen teleologically as allowing for the orderly use of marks.
How else would a consumer be confused if there is no use of
the trademark by the legitimate owner or with his or her
consent? People do not register trademarks to obtain a
certificate from a government. They register them because
they are using the trademark in commerce (or intend to) and
will then need to maintain order.
* Article 17 gives WTO members the ability to limit the
exclusive rights of trademark owners, particularly in Article
16 (themselves already limited by nature). In doing so, Article
17 also recognizes that trademark owners have legitimate
interests beyond the mere ability to exclude third parties from
infringing their trademarks.
* Articles 19 and 20 provide limits concerning restrictions on
the use imposed by governments. Under Article 19.1, a ban on
use cannot be used to cancel a registration, signaling that the
ban may well be temporary because that is precisely why a
trademark owner would want to maintain the registration.
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The above conclusions provide a contextual way of reading
Article 20, which is central in the plain packaging debates and in the
case brought against Australia in the WTO.
Applying them to the issue of plain packaging, the first step is to
recall that a WTO member may take reasonable measures to reduce
smoking, in particular among younger smokers. Article 8 and other
WTO documents recognize public health as a valid field to take
appropriate policy measures (subject to other provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement), and tobacco is assuredly a serious public health issue.
However, the TRIPS Agreement's interpretation in this context will
impact other areas of trademarks, commerce, and probably other
intellectual property rights. This Article thus calls for a careful way
of tackling the issue.
Some may prefer to see this debate as a fight against "big
tobacco." As such, they may attach much, if not all, of the importance
of the case to its outcome-namely, whether Australia's strict plain
packaging measure, or for that matter any measure to control
tobacco, can withstand trade-based scrutiny. The case, for them, is all
about "winning," not as much about how to get there. However, while
the case is undoubtedly about an important public health issue, other
key issues are at play. Independently of who "wins" the panel
report(s) and a possible Appellate Body report, the legal analysis of
the public health, intellectual property intersection is exceedingly
important for the future.
The Australian case affords an opportunity to reaffirm the
contextual interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, in light of its
object and purpose, as guided by the VCLT-and perhaps to depart
from strict formalism-without amending the TRIPS Agreement. The
Appellate Body's direction concerning the VCLT should not be
ignored for systemic reasons-namely, the integrity of the WTO
dispute-settlement system. The VCLT's insistence on object and
purpose, and the DSU's requirement not to add or remove words from
a treaty but rather to understand and give effect to their meaning is
essential to the proper interpretation of Article 20.
The Australian plain packaging measures go practically as far as
one can go in terms of imposing encumbrances on trademark owners.
If, as just mentioned, the rights and interests of trademark owners
are best seen as a continuum, then a high degree of encumbrance
might logically lead to a higher burden to justify a measure. In any
case, the authors of this Article do not believe that it is unreasonable
to suggest that, as a result, this measure warrants close scrutiny by
the DSB.
Put differently, while the normative appeal of tobacco control is
strong, there is a normative case to be made for getting trademark
(and, more broadly, intellectual property) rules right. Trademarks
affect consumer information and protection. Intellectual property is
directly linked in a myriad of ways to innovation outcomes. This
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Article does not suggest that the public health impacts of tobacco use
should somehow be measured against the economic impact of
trademarks and innovation, for this would ignore a number of key
dimensions of both issues. However, there is a need for a balanced
and methodical approach by the WTO. Both the VCLT and previous
panel and Appellate Body reports contain the tools that are needed to
get to a balanced outcome.
Fundamentally, the path to protecting public health can and
should be carved out without doing unnecessary collateral damage to
trademark law. Indeed, it is desirable that it not do so because
trademark law is about far more than plain packaging of
cigarettes. 29 7
The politics should be left to the politicians. It does seem
inconsistent, however, to require stringent rules around exceptions to
patent law in the TRIPS Agreement for public health purposeS298 but
to suggest that there is a wide, almost unlimited exception to
trademarks in the name of public health. Moreover, this is the first
case in which complaints have been filed by developing countries
defending intellectual property owners in a TRIPS Agreement
context. 299

297.
One question this Article does not explore but that is worth mentioning in
conclusion is the possibility that cigarettes (and more generally tobacco) may need to be
directly addressed by the WTO as a special case. This would have to be done by its
members, not by just interpreting the TRIPS Agreement. This issue was raised by the
Dominican Republic in the TRIPS Council.
Indeed, the exceptions for public health relating to compulsory licensing of
298.
pharmaceuticals have many detailed requirements. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note
1, arts. 31, 31bis (disclosing compulsory licensing requirements).
299.
The concern raised by the Dominican Republic in the TRIPS Council was
that: "The proposed [Australian] law would hurt tobacco producers in small and
vulnerable economies." Press Release, World Trade Organization, Members Debate
Cigarette Plain-Packaging's Impact on Trademark Rights (June 7, 2011), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/newsl 1e/ trip_07junl 1_e.htm.

